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Abstract 
This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism 
require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect 
their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures 
such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be 
internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint?  
    The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is 
fundamentally committed to the protection of individual freedom, I argue that states should 
allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual 
freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits 
to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of (more) progressive-minded 
citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the 
state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own 
members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met:   
(i) Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to 
change cultural affiliations. 
(ii) The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe 
harm on children. 
To realise condition (i), which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights 
strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an 
autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of 
defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to 
ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition (ii) is not considered to be 
central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious 
whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can 
justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear 
that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible. 
     My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects 
the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal 
strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives 
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members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that 
Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we 
will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not 
appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual 
freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to 
live (autonomously or non-autonomously) in accordance with one’s conception of the good. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Aims, Scope, and Background 
Though the ‘liberal West’ is often pitted against the ‘illiberal rest’, it is clear that states in the 
Occident do not always abide by liberalism’s core commitment: the protection of individual 
freedom. In Luxembourg, same-sex couples cannot marry; in Switzerland, asylum-seekers 
are prohibited from using public schools and sports facilities; and in the United States, 
citizens’ emails are stored without their consent. It seems that any liberal worthy of the name 
should be sceptical of these restrictions on people’s liberties, especially when they are 
distributed unequally amongst a population. 
     In this dissertation, I investigate whether a similar scepticism is called for when the state 
allows minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et 
cetera to impose illiberal restrictions on their members’ liberties. More specifically, my aim 
is to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state 
remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own 
members? 
1
 Assuming liberalism to be a political ideology that is fundamentally committed 
to the protection of individual freedom, the answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified 
‘no’. I claim that, in order to respect the individual freedom of conservative members of 
illiberal minority cultures, these groups should have room to be internally illiberal; at the 
same time, I argue that this room should be limited in order to protect the individual freedom 
of their dissident members, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural 
practices.  
    Before looking at the conditions under which states should allow illiberal minority cultures 
to be internally illiberal, however, it is important to clarify this dissertation’s key concepts, as 
well as to account for its focal points. 
1.1.1 Conceptual Clarification 
Following Bikhu Parekh (2006, p.143), I understand a cultural community to be a group of 
people who share a “historically created system of […] beliefs and practices” in terms of 
                                                 
1
 The reason why this dissertation asks how the state should deal with internally illiberal minority cultures rather 
than other political entities is that states are (still) the most powerful political actors in today’s world.  
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which they “understand, regulate, and structure their individual and collective lives” (Parekh, 
2006, p.143). This definition allows for much diversity amongst cultural communities: they 
may differ in size, have their own territory or not, and be organised along different lines 
(ethnic, religious, ideological, linguistic, et cetera). Another dimension in which these groups 
differ is their economic and political power; whilst the majority culture is generally the 
economically and politically most powerful group, there are some notable exceptions.
2
  
However, we also find much diversity within cultural communities. Many, if not most of 
these communities harbour subgroups with different views on the community’s tenets and 
practices. For example, within the Amish community, there are factions who strictly refrain 
from using modern technology and remaining in contact with ex-members, but also factions 
who stay in touch with ex-members and use cell-phones, pagers, tractors, et cetera.  
    By illiberal cultural practices, I mean forms of institutionalised behaviour of cultural 
communities such as traditions, rituals, and customs that negate people’s free and/or equal 
status by e.g. hindering the exercise of their civil and political rights, impairing the 
development of their personal autonomy, and/or entrenching cultural hierarchies. 
Paradigmatic examples of illiberal cultural practices can be found in the custom of the Pueblo 
Indians to deny Protestant converts access to communal resources, the Orthodox Jewish 
marriage law that denies women the right to initiate divorce, and the practice of the Amish to 
withdraw their children from school before the legal age. 
    As noted above, the kinds of cultural communities with which this dissertation is 
concerned are those of illiberal minority cultures (unless specified otherwise, this restriction 
of scope will be presupposed when I talk about cultural communities). Illiberal minority 
cultures are construed here as cultural communities that have fewer members than the liberal 
majority culture, and that are less committed to liberal values than the latter. Typical 
examples include the communities of the Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, Amish, et 
cetera. By contrast, a liberal majority culture is understood to be the most sizable cultural 
community within a given society of which membership depends on a commitment to the 
liberal values of individual freedom and equality. Since this ideological commitment is also a 
sufficient condition for membership, liberal majority cultures are assumed to harbour many 
different (sometimes overlapping) subgroups. For example, within Western societies they 
                                                 
2
 One might think of South-Africa during the Apartheid or Assad’s Syria where the Alawites, a Shi’a minority, 
holds most of the economic and political power. 
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include progressive factions within Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, as well as national-
minorities such as the Basques, Frisians, and Scots. 
1.1.2 Focal Points  
Having cut our way through this conceptual complexity, it is important to account for this 
dissertation’s focal points.  
 
Illiberal Minority Cultures 
First, I want to explicate why this dissertation focuses on illiberal practices of illiberal 
minority cultures rather than liberal majority cultures. The reason, it should be noted, is not 
that liberal majority cultures do not engage in illiberal practices; as the continued 
subordination of their female members shows, this is not the case. Rather, the reason for 
concentrating on illiberal minority cultures is that their illiberal practices seem to pose a 
greater challenge from a liberal viewpoint. For one thing, many of these groups appear to 
engage in a greater number, as well as more extreme, illiberal practices. In addition to this, 
some illiberal minority cultures explicitly claim the freedom to be (internally) illiberal, which 
raises the question of whether a liberal state should defer to their demands. Again, this is 
something that does seem to carry over to liberal majority cultures; it looks as though most 
members of these groups would agree that the state should rectify their culture’s illiberal 
elements, or at least many of them. Given these differences, I believe that it is important to 
discuss state responses to illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures separately, which is 
why this dissertation focuses on illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures.  
    Now, it is worthwhile to point out that this dissertation does not consider whether different 
kinds of illiberal minority cultures should be treated differently by the liberal state. Contra 
Okin (1999a; 2005), I do not assume that illiberal minority cultures that have suffered 
oppression at the hands of the state, or continue to do so, should have greater latitude to 
engage in illiberal practices than illiberal minority cultures who have not suffered state 
oppression (on Okin’s account, the state may (temporarily) tolerate certain illiberal practices 
of (formerly) oppressed minority cultures, provided that there is broad popular support for the 
maintenance of these practices amongst their members; see Okin; 2005). Neither do I 
suppose, as Kymlicka (1995, pp.152-72) does, that cultural communities with legitimate 
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claims to collective self-government ought to be treated differently by the liberal state (as we 
will see in section 2.2, Kymlicka’s view is that, unless these groups commit grave and 
systematic violations of basic rights and liberties, the state should only non-coercively try to 
liberalise them). Instead, my principles for dealing with illiberal cultural practices apply to all 
illiberal minority cultures.  
    This is not to suggest that a history of (continued) oppression or legitimate claims to 
collective self-government should not make a difference as to how the state deals with 
illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures; whether these factors should play a role is 
something I leave open here. This omission is justified, I believe, because even if the answer 
to this question is in the affirmative, it is still important to clarify first how the state should 
deal with illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures regardless of whether they have a 
history of (continued) oppression or legitimate claims to collective self-government. The 
reason is that before we can consider whether exemptions to the rules are to be made, we 
should know what the rules are. 
 
Self-Regarding Illiberal Cultural Practices 
Second, this dissertation concentrates on illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that 
affect their own members rather than outsiders. My motivation for focusing on these self-
regarding cultural practices is that they are the most contentious from a liberal perspective. 
Whilst no liberal worthy of the name would hold that the Amish should be allowed to curtail 
the education of non-members,
3
 whether they should be permitted to withdraw their own 
children from school before the legal age is disputed within liberal circles. In a similar vein, 
virtually no liberal would hold that Salafist groups can legitimately require outsiders to abide 
by Sharia law, yet whether they can legitimately require their own members to do so is 
contested. 
                                                 
3
 This is not to suggest that the Amish want this; given the little contact they seek with wider society, it seems 
unlikely that they would advocate restrictions on the education of outsiders. 
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Cultural Communities  
Finally, it is worthwhile explaining why this dissertation focuses on illiberal practices of 
cultural communities rather than other kinds of groups such as moustache societies or states. 
The reason for doing so is twofold: (i) illiberal cultural practices are especially controversial 
from a liberal viewpoint as cultural communities, I will suggest below, cannot be 
unequivocally classified as voluntary or involuntary groups; and (ii) there is much at stake as 
the fact that cultural communities tend to have a profound and pervasive impact on many 
different aspects of their members’ lives suggests that the state’s stance towards illiberal 
cultural practices will have considerable consequences for many citizens. 
    Regarding reason (i), it is plain that cultural communities are not voluntary groups in any 
clear sense; the fact that most of us were born into our cultural communities, and 
consequently did not consent to become members, gives us reason to doubt their 
voluntariness.
4
 At the same time, an argument can be made that they are voluntary groups. 
According to this argument, people who remain with their cultural communities despite being 
able to leave, and knowing that they are able to leave, ‘tacitly consent’ to cultural 
membership; insofar as enough members meet these conditions, this is then thought to justify 
the classification of cultural communities as voluntary groups. (Though idea that individuals 
tacitly consent to membership in this particular context (or in all possible contexts) may seem 
far-fetched, I suspect that when people argue that the state should not interfere with cultural 
communities that treat their members badly if these members are free to leave the group, they 
often implicitly rely on the tacit-consent argument). 
     Now, it should be asked: why does it matter whether or not cultural communities are 
voluntary groups? The answer is that for many liberals, the voluntariness of people’s 
memberships of groups can justify – at least from a political perspective - their exposure to 
(some of) these groups’ illiberal practices, which is why they are generally willing to give 
voluntary groups more latitude to engage in illiberal practices than non-voluntary groups.
5
 
What underlies this stance, as Leslie Green remarks, seems to be the belief that “if 
membership of voluntary groups subjects adherents to practices that would otherwise be 
                                                 
4
 Though Buddhists who believe that people choose their parents before their birth might deny this. 
5
 This does not preclude the possibility that liberal theorists may want the state to interfere with a wide range of 
illiberal practices of (some) voluntary groups, even if they only affect their own members. In many cases, these 
practices will inflict severe harm and/or be highly discriminatory such as the policy of the Boy Scouts of 
America to expel members for being openly homosexual. 
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discriminatory, unjust, or foolish, then these disadvantages nonetheless flow from a free 
decision to belong, and any of them can be evaded by leaving the group” (Green, 1998, 
p.168).  
     If there is indeed a positive correlation between a group’s voluntariness and the 
willingness of liberals to tolerate its illiberal practices, then one reason suggests itself as to 
why state interference with illiberal practices of cultural communities tends to be more 
controversial than state interference with illiberal practices of moustache societies or states. 
The reason is that the (in)voluntary character of these latter groups is less in dispute; the fact 
that state membership is commonly considered to be less voluntary than cultural membership 
would explain why most liberals seem to agree that it is more problematic for states to engage 
in illiberal practices than for cultural communities. Similarly, the fact that membership of 
moustache societies is generally considered to be more voluntary than cultural membership 
would explain why most liberals seems to find it more problematic when cultural 
communities are internally illiberal than when moustache societies are. 
    The other feature of cultural communities that makes it worthwhile concentrating on their 
illiberal practices, is that people’s cultural membership tends to have a deep and pervasive 
impact on various aspects of their lives. For most people, being a member of a particular 
cultural community profoundly shapes their beliefs, feelings, and behaviour; moreover, their 
cultural membership tends to influences how other people relate to them. As a result, we see 
that whether one is born a member of e.g. the Amish community, the Pueblo Indian 
community, or the liberal majority culture normally makes a big difference as to how one’s 
life turns out (the same applies, of course, to the position that one occupies within the group; 
e.g. the life-prospects for a boy in the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community are relevantly 
different to those for a girl). This is a pertinent point, as it suggests that whether the state does 
or does not remedy illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures – and, if it does, in what 
way(s) - can be expected to have profound consequences for their members’ lives.  This, I 
believe, provides us with a further reason to focus on illiberal practices of cultural 
communities. 
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1.1.3 Claims 
Having clarified this dissertation’s key concepts and accounted for its focal points, it is time 
to look at the conditions under which the state should tolerate internally illiberal minority 
cultures. In chapter 4, I will argue that an illiberal minority culture should be free to engage 
in illiberal practices that only affect their own members if and only if the following 
conditions are met:  
(i) Its adult members have substantive exit rights, that is, rights to a realistic ability to 
leave their cultural community for another cultural community. 
(ii) The cultural community in question does not engage in illiberal practices that inflict 
severe harm on children. 
Regarding condition (i), this dissertation assumes that in order to leave her cultural 
community, a person has to meet two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. First, she 
has to withdraw from the rights and obligations of cultural membership. Second, she has to 
renounce the authority that members of her cultural community may claim over her. Thus 
understood, exiting need not be a physical act – even if one’s cultural community is 
geographically concentrated, it may be possible to exit one’s culture without moving away 
from its members (cf. Vitikainen, 2012, pp.88-90).  
    Now, in order to have substantive exit rights, I deem it necessary that a person be able, and 
knows that she is able, to live a decent life in another cultural community within her society 
(what this means will be explicated in chapter 4). In the case of illiberal minority cultures, we 
will see at different places in this dissertation that it crucial from a liberal perspective that this 
other cultural community be the liberal majority culture. The reason for this is that the 
individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected 
(particularly that of dissident members) unless they have a meaningful opportunity to escape 
exposure to their culture’s illiberal practices. 
     In order to secure substantive exit rights for members of illiberal minority cultures, this 
dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’ assigns five tasks to the state. First, it should 
make an autonomy-facilitating, multicultural education compulsory for children. Second it 
should provide citizens who are left destitute by exiting their cultural community with 
financial assistance. Third, it should offer citizens services that will help them integrate into 
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another cultural community (one might think of language training or funding of support 
groups for ex-members). Fourth, it should prevent cultural communities from forcing their 
members to remain with the group, as well as interfere with (cultural) practices that, whilst 
not forcing their members to stay put, are overly detrimental to their ability to exit (e.g. foot-
binding or child marriages).
6
 Finally, the state should ensure that the admission and 
integration of members of illiberal minority cultures into the liberal majority culture is not 
hindered by discrimination, racism, xenophobia, et cetera. 
    Condition (ii) maintains that the state should not allow cultural communities to engage in 
(illiberal) cultural practices that inflict severe harm on children. What underlies this condition 
is the belief that a person’s bodily and psychological integrity is of such importance that, 
except in rare cases (e.g. when adults are being punished for their wrongdoings), no human 
being should incur severe harm unless it is within his power to escape it. Since children will 
normally lack this power as they do not have a realistic ability to exercise their exit rights, 
this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy prescribes that the state should remedy 
(illiberal) cultural practices that severely harm them.
7
     
    It should be noted that condition (ii) is not considered central to this strategy. To see why 
not, notice that, as a liberal strategy, its primary aim is to protect citizens’ individual freedom. 
Yet, if the protection of individual freedom is what fundamentally matters, then it is not 
evident that it should require the state to interfere with cultural practices that harm children. 
The reason is that it is unclear whether children’s exposure to harmful cultural practices 
constitutes a greater infringement on their liberty than exposure to harmless cultural practices 
such as going to church and celebrating Bar Mitzvahs that liberals – for good reasons - do not 
want to remedy (whilst children are often unable to escape their culture’s harmful practices, 
the same holds true of these harmless practices). But if this is so, then it becomes dubious 
whether this strategy’s commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can justify 
condition (ii). 
    The reason why my favoured substantive exit rights strategy nonetheless proposes a ban on 
cultural practices that severely harm children is that it seems to render this approach more 
                                                 
6
 ‘Overly detrimental’ here means that even if the other four measures of this dissertation’s substantive exit 
rights strategy are successfully implemented, these cultural practices would still deny them a meaningful 
opportunity to change cultural affiliations. I will say more about these kinds of practices in section 4.2.2. 
7
 Why this does not extend to all cultural practices that harm children will be discussed in section 4.2.2.1. 
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plausible. Many liberals (as well as non-liberals) would agree, and quite rightly I want to 
suggest, that a person’s bodily and psychological integrity is so important that nobody should 
be subjected to severely harmful cultural practices without there being a realistic possibility 
of avoiding these practices. However, if we accept this principle, then the inability of most 
children to exit their cultural community makes it incumbent on the state to protect them 
from severely harmful cultural practices. 
1.2 Rationale  
This leaves one question: why should liberals accept this dissertation’s substantive exit rights 
strategy rather than one of the alternative liberal strategies for dealing with illiberal cultural 
practices? 
    The main reason is that it is the best guardian of what was identified as liberalism’s core 
commitment: the protection of individual freedom. More specifically, I will argue that this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy adjudicates the conflicts that exist between the 
wishes of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures to preserve the status quo and 
the wishes of their dissident members to liberalise the group in a fairer way than rival liberal 
strategies. ‘Fairer’ here means that this approach is more likely to give sufficient protection to 
the individual freedom of conservative and dissident members, whereby ‘individual freedom’ 
is understood as the ability to endorse, and act upon, one’s conception of the good. 8  
    Now, it should be noted that the above definition of individual freedom may take a more or 
less demanding meaning depending on whether one accepts that a free person should 
independently or autonomously endorse her conception of the good.  
Freedom (1): The ability to endorse, and act on, one’s conception of the good, regardless of 
whether this endorsement is independent.  
Freedom (2): The ability to independently endorse one’s conception of the good, and act on 
this conception. 
Before asking which kind of individual freedom is better protected by this dissertation’s 
substantive exit rights strategy than by rival liberal strategies, it is important to explicate the 
differences between these two kinds of individual freedom.  
                                                 
8
 ‘A conception of the good’ is understood in this context as a more or less consistent set of beliefs that people 
believe should guide their lives. 
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    According to freedom 1, a person is free inasmuch as she can live in accordance with 
whatever set of beliefs she thinks should guide her life. Here, it does not matter whether she 
endorses these beliefs independently; even if they are instilled in her through e.g. 
brainwashing, indoctrination, hypnosis, or other autonomy-inhibiting processes, she would 
still be considered free as long as she can live in accordance with them. There are at least two 
reasons why liberals may only want the state to protect this kind of individual freedom. One 
reason is that they believe that personal autonomy does not add anything to a person’s 
individual freedom because, in their view, there are no relevant differences between 
influences that are commonly considered to impede personal autonomy (e.g. brainwashing, 
indoctrination, hypnosis) and those that do not (e.g. advice, certain forms of socialisation, 
inspiration). Another reason is that they believe that state measures that promote personal 
autonomy (e.g. a compulsory autonomy-facilitating education) infringe on the ability of 
certain people to act on their conception of the good (regardless of whether this is done 
autonomously), especially of those who are ill-disposed towards individual self-direction.  
    By contrast, freedom 2 supposes that a person’s conception of the good only includes those 
beliefs about the good life that he independently endorses. What this means is that if he 
reflects on these beliefs (or were to do so), he would independently affirm them, or at the 
very least not feel alienated from them. ‘Independently’ means that his endorsement of the 
beliefs in question is untainted by autonomy-inhibiting influences such as brainwashing, 
indoctrination, hypnosis, et cetera. If this requirement is not met, then, according to the 
present conception of individual freedom, this person is not free, regardless of whether he can 
act on ‘his’ conception of the good. The assumption here is that, because he has been 
subjected to autonomy-inhibiting influences, his conception of the good cannot be 
appropriately ascribed to him. As a result, liberals who think that freedom (2) merits state 
protection will normally advocate state measures to protect citizens from brainwashing, 
indoctrination, hypnosis, et cetera.  
     Now, it should be asked: when I say that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy 
better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than 
alternative liberal strategies, which kind of individual freedom is meant?  
    The answer is ‘both kinds of individual freedom’. To show that this is so, I will assess two 
liberal strategies for dealing with internally illiberal minority cultures that are considered to 
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be the main rivals of this dissertation’ substantive exit rights strategy, and that each aim to 
promote a different kind of individual freedom. As we will see, the strategy proposed by Will 
Kymlicka aims to protect a kind of individual freedom that is (broadly) similar to freedom 2, 
whereas the strategy proposed by Chandran Kukathas seeks to protect a kind of individual 
freedom that is (broadly) similar to freedom 1. In both cases, I argue that this dissertation’s 
substantive exit rights strategy better serves the kind of individual freedom these alternative 
strategies aim to protect. This means, amongst other things, that regardless of whether 
liberals believe that the state should promote freedom 1 or 2, they will end up with this my 
favoured substantive exit rights strategy.  
 
Omission of Rawls  
Finally, I want to explain why this dissertation does not discuss the work of John Rawls. The 
omission of Rawls may come as a surprise as his work has a significant influence on 
discussions about how liberal states should respond to the ethical heterogeneity within their 
societies. The reason why I am not including his work, is that, even though Rawls’ aim in 
Political Liberalism (2005, p.63) is to tailor his theory of justice to the fact of (reasonable) 
pluralism within constitutional democracies, he does not explicate as to how the liberal state 
should deal with domestic (illiberal) cultural diversity.
9
 This lack of clarity means that 
including his work would involve a lengthy discussion about his possible position, something 
for which there is insufficient space in this dissertation. 
     To be sure, Rawls’ comments on the freedom of non-political groups (e.g. families, 
associations) to govern their internal affairs provide some clues how his state is likely to 
respond to illiberal practices of minority cultures (cf. Rawls, 2005, pp.10-1; p.15). As I argue 
elsewhere (De Vries, 2014), one may expect that, given that the aim of Rawls’ political 
liberalism is to make his liberal conception of justice Salonfähig to societies that are marked 
by pluralism, cultural communities would probably have some freedom to be internally 
illiberal as they are an important part of this pluralism. If this were not the case, then it seems 
that Rawls could no longer credibly maintain that his theory of justice is not a (partially) 
                                                 
9
 According to Kymlicka (1995, p.128), the reason why Rawls does not discuss how the state should deal with 
domestic cultural diversity is that he mistakenly “equates the political community with a single ‘complete 
culture’ and with a single ‘people’ who belong to the same society and culture”. 
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comprehensive doctrine as his principles of justice would seem to apply to many, if not most 
domains of human life (Rawls, 2005, p.xvi). Relatedly, serious doubts would arise about 
whether his political conception of liberal justice can be “freely endorsed”, as Rawls intends, 
“by doctrines that are both “religious and nonreligious, liberal and non-liberal” (Rawls, 2005, 
p.xxxviii). 
   At the same time, there is reason to believe that Rawls may not want to tolerate illiberal 
practices of minority cultures. In order to see this, notice that according to his criteria, 
cultural communities seem to belong to what he terms the “basic structure of society” 
(Rawls,1999, p.6). On Rawls’ account, the social and political institutions that are part of this 
structure are those that “define men’s rights and duties and influence their life prospects, 
what they can expect to be, and how well they can hope to do” (Rawls, 1999, pp.6-7). Yet, if 
this is his criterion for deciding which institutions are to be regulated by liberal principles 
justice, then it seems that cultural communities, as well as families as Okin (1994) has 
argued, would also fall under the category of these institution. After all, there is no denying 
that cultural communities help define people’s rights and duties (even if not in a strictly legal 
sense), and that they have a great impact on their life prospects (see section 1.1.2).  
     Though I believe that that it is still more likely that Rawls, for the reasons mentioned 
above, would not consider cultural communities to be part of the basic structure, discussing 
whether this belief is warranted would occupy too much space here. 
 
1.3 Limitations  
Having clarified this dissertation’s aims and background, it is important to look at its main 
limitations.  
   The first limitation pertains to this dissertation’s focus on the core liberal value of 
individual freedom. In my assessment of the three liberal strategies for dealing with internally 
illiberal minority cultures, various social goals are left aside that many theorists will say 
should inform these kinds of strategies. One might think of the promotion of social cohesion, 
civic solidarity, economic prosperity, et cetera. Without denying the importance of these 
goals for public policy, this dissertation assumes that, from a liberal point of view, the 
protection of individual freedom is normally more important than their realisation (both 
individually as well as compounded). 
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 This dissertation’s second limitation is its agnosticism about whether liberals should 
support the conferral of positive group rights on illiberal minority cultures such as language 
support, subsidies for cultural community centres, guaranteed political representation, et 
cetera. It is true that my substantive exit rights strategy’s (restricted) toleration of illiberal 
cultural practices goes well with the provision of these rights. This is because both this 
toleration and the provision of positive group rights will help illiberal minority cultures to 
retain their cultural distinctiveness. Yet, it should be clear that this strategy is not committed 
to this latter form of support, as liberals who advocate a (more) minimalist state can also 
accept its precepts. In those cases, they will advocate a state that tolerates illiberal practices 
of illiberal minority cultures under the conditions set out in section 1.1, but does so without 
giving these groups active support.  
 The upshot of this discussion is that inasmuch a full-blown normative theory of cultural 
diversity states whether (illiberal) minority cultures should be entitled to positive group 
rights, and if so, under what conditions, this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy 
does not offer such a theory. 
 
1.4 Structure 
This dissertation has the following structure. In chapters 2 and 3, the main rival liberal 
strategies for dealing with illiberal cultural practices are discussed. I will start by looking at 
Kymlicka’s perfectionist liberal strategy (chapter 2), followed by Kukathas’ plain exit rights 
strategy (chapter 3). The aim of these chapters is to show that both approaches are defective; 
I will argue that Kymlicka’s strategy, by attempting to turn cultural communities into proto-
liberal states, pays insufficient heed to the individual freedom of conservative members of 
illiberal minority cultures, whereas Kukathas’ strategy, by failing to secure substantive exit 
rights, does not appropriately protect the individual freedom of these groups’ dissident 
members. In each case, it is concluded that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy 
offers a better alternative from a liberal viewpoint. The aim of chapter 4, then, is to look in 
greater detail at the aims and measures of this strategy. Finally, chapter 5 will answer an 
important critique of this strategy, namely that it fails to appropriately protect people from 
unfair treatment by members of their cultural community. 
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2. Kymlicka’s Perfectionist Liberal Strategy 
This chapter assesses Will Kymlicka’s perfectionist liberal strategy for dealing with 
internally illiberal minority cultures. In a nutshell, this strategy tries to remedy the illiberal 
practices of these groups in order to create a “fully liberal society”, that is a society in which 
all cultural communities are liberal (Kymlicka, 1989, pp. 170-1). By doing so, it means to 
protect what Kymlicka sees as the supreme liberal value: personal autonomy (Kymlicka, 
1995, p.80; p.152).  
    This chapter argues that Kymlicka’s strategy is unsatisfactory on two counts. First, it faces 
a substantial pragmatic challenge as its attempts to liberalise minority cultures threaten to 
spark a conservative backlash amongst illiberal minority cultures. The reason why these 
backlashes are problematic for Kymlicka, is that they undermine his task of creating a “fully 
liberal society”. Second, it is claimed that Kymlicka’s strategy does not appropriately protect 
the individual freedom of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures, which will be 
construed in this chapter as personal autonomy or what I earlier described as freedom 2 (see 
section 1.2). To rectify this, I maintain that a liberal state should tolerate illiberal practices of 
cultural communities that only affect their own members, provided that these practices do not 
inflict severe harm on children and/or deny their members substantive exit rights.
10
 
     The reason for using freedom 2 as a touchstone for Kymlicka’s strategy rather than the 
more negative liberty described by ‘freedom 1 (see section 1.1), is that this allows us to 
evaluate his approach on (more or less) its own terms. This is possible because freedom 2 
seems to be similar enough to the type of freedom Kymlicka’s strategy aims to promote to 
ensure that the conclusions reached about this strategy would barely differ if we were to 
assess it on the basis of its own conception of personal autonomy (I will say more about this 
below). To be able to see why it is important to assess Kymlicka’s strategy on its own terms, 
remember that this dissertation’s objective is to show that my favoured substantive exit rights 
strategy better protects citizens’ individual freedom than the main rival strategies proposed by 
Kymlicka and Kukathas. However, this is can only be done if these strategies are evaluated 
                                                 
10
 This chapter will be mostly concerned with the second condition; the first condition will be discussed at 
length in chapter 4. 
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on the basis of the kind of liberty they are actually trying to protect rather than on the basis of 
a kind they do not accept. 
     Regarding the similarities between the notions of personal autonomy held by Kymlicka 
and this author, notice that whereas freedom 2 was defined in this dissertation as the “the 
ability to independently endorse one’s conception of the good, and act on this conception”, 
Kymlicka argues in Multicultural Citizenship (1995, p.158) that a person is autonomous 
insofar as she is “free to assess and potentially revise existing ends”. As I understand it, the 
‘freedom to assess existing ends’ on Kymlicka’s account is broadly similar to what I termed 
the ‘ability to independently endorse a conception of the good’. This becomes clear once it is 
noted that to independently endorse a conception of the good simply means that one endorses 
one’s conception of the good free from coercion and manipulation, and that this requires that 
one be able to assess the ends that comprise one’s conception of the good in order to ensure 
that one finds these ends worthy of one’s continued allegiance (though this need not involve 
Socratic scrutiny, some degree of critical evaluation will be necessary for this). 
    Let us suppose, then, that the conceptions of personal autonomy held by Kymlicka and I 
have enough in common to guarantee that the conclusions reached about his strategy would 
not be significantly different if we were to use his conception of personal autonomy to assess 
it.   
2.1 A Liberal Defence of Minority Rights 
It may be surprising to many that Kymlicka’ strategy seeks to remedy the illiberal practices 
of minority cultures, as he is widely seen as one of the foremost defenders of multiculturalism 
– a political and intellectual movement that is commonly associated with state toleration, and 
sometimes also accommodation of cultural differences. Yet, as it will become clear in this 
section, there is no contradiction; Kymlicka’s reasons for granting minority cultures what he 
terms “group-differentiated rights” (1995, p.7) are the same as his reasons for remedying 
their illiberal practices. In order to understand why Kymlicka is unwilling to tolerate illiberal 
cultural practices, as well as to see how this stance fits into his overall normative theory of 
cultural diversity, it is therefore important to look at his defence of minority rights first. 
    Kymlicka’s aim in Liberalism, Community and Culture (1989) and Multicultural 
Citizenship (1995) is to show that liberalism and multiculturalism are not antagonistically 
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related as it is widely held.
11
 In his view, support of marginalised minority cultures is not just 
compatible with liberal-egalitarian justice, but actually demanded by it. More specifically, he 
argues that liberal states have a duty to compensate minority cultures that are disadvantaged 
by the tendency of state policies and institutions to favour the interests of majority culture 
(Kymlicka, 1995, pp.107-30; 2002). For him, the way to do this is to offer these 
disadvantaged cultures “group differentiated rights” that supplement their members’ civil and 
political rights (Kymlicka, 1995, pp.34-5).
12
 
     Now, the reason why Kymlicka wants the state to support marginalised minority cultures 
is that he believes that all citizens should have a right to a “stable cultural structure” within 
their cultural community (Kymlicka, 1995, pp.84-93). On his account, the availability of this 
structure is not important because cultural diversity is an intrinsic good, but rather because it 
allows people to exercise their personal autonomy. By providing us with what he terms a 
“meaningful context of choice”, a stable cultural structure is thought to be a prerequisite for a 
self-directed life (Kymlicka, 1995, pp.121-3). Kymlicka thus notes that  
 
“It’s only through having a rich and secure cultural structure that people can become aware, 
in a vivid way, of the options available to them, and intelligently examine their value. 
Without such a cultural structure, children and adolescents lack adequate role-models which 
leads to despondency and escapism (Kymlicka, 1989, pp.165-6).  
 
Notice that it is assumed here that we are not constituted by the ends of our cultural 
community as some communitarians have contended (cf. Sandel, 1998). If this were the case, 
then rather than making the exercise of our personal autonomy possible, our cultural 
membership would inhibit it as we would just do whatever we were encultured to do. Instead, 
                                                 
11
 A wide-spread assumption is that liberalism’s commitment to the protection of individual rights collides with 
the aim of multiculturalism to grant group rights to (marginalised) cultural communities, as many believe that 
these rights may be used to curtail the liberties of individuals. 
12
 Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes three kinds of group rights, namely self-government rights”, i.e. rights to 
political self-determination within a federation or in the form of an independent state; ”poly-ethnic rights”, i.e. 
rights that are meant to promote the integration of minorities into the mainstream society such as exemptions 
from Sunday-hours for Jews and Muslims and funding of English language classes in Anglophone countries; 
and “special representation rights”, i.e. proportionate representation amongst political representatives of racial, 
ethnic, sex-and-gender-based, and ability-based groups. Not all minorities within the liberal state, however, can 
lay claim on all of these rights on Kymlicka’s account. Whilst indigenous peoples and national minorities such 
as the Quebecois and Flemish seem to be entitled to all of them, immigrant groups can only claim poly-ethnic 
and special representation rights, whereas social movements (e.g. feminists or gay movements)  can only claim 
special representation rights. 
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Kymlicka believes that we can stand back from our communal ends to examine and possibly 
revise them – if not all simultaneously than by piecemeal (Kymlicka, 1995, p.81).  
     Now, it should be asked: why does Kymlicka ground his argument for minority rights on 
the value of personal autonomy? The short answer is that he sees personal autonomy as a 
prerequisite of the good life. To be able to live good or valuable lives, he writes, we should 
not only “lead our lives from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives 
value to life”, but also be “free to question those beliefs, to examine them” (Kymlicka, 1995, 
p.81). Indeed, the ability to live self-directed lives is so important according to Kymlicka that 
he refers to our access to a stable cultural structure as a “primary good” in the Rawlsian sense 
(Kymlicka, 1989: 177-8). 
    At this point, it should be noted that Kymlicka’s conclusion that marginalised minority 
cultures should receive group-differentiated rights does not automatically follow from the 
premises that (i) a “stable cultural structure” is a conditio sine qua non of personal autonomy, 
and (ii) that a liberal state has a pre-emptive commitment to protecting citizens’ personal 
autonomy. For one thing, it remains unclear why the state should protect marginalised 
minority cultures if their members can find a stable cultural structure within other cultural 
communities. Rather than ensuring that these individuals have access to a stable cultural 
structure within their own cultural community, one might thus argue that the state should 
ensure that they have access to some stable cultural structure by fighting the racism and 
discrimination that may hinder their assimilation into a (more) viable cultural community. 
     Kymlicka’s response, which provides us with one of the two missing premises in his 
argument for minority rights, is that (iii) individuals cannot justly be required to change 
cultural affiliations to attain access to a stable cultural structure. Whilst he admits that it is not 
impossible for people to leave their cultural community, he remarks that this is “best seen as 
renouncing something to which one is reasonably entitled” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.86).  
    The final premise that Kymlicka invokes in order to build his case for minority rights, is 
that (iv) these rights are the best means of securing a stable cultural structure for members of 
marginalised minority cultures. This is not self-evident. To see why not, notice that if the 
marginalisation of minority cultures arises because the state’s policies and institutions are 
biased towards the interests of the majority culture, then it might be held that, rather than 
compensating minority cultures for this bias, the state should ensure that its policies and 
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institutions are not culturally biased to begin with. This would then take away the need for 
minority rights as the cultural inequalities these rights are meant to redress would not arise. 
    In response to this suggested alternative to his compensation-based approach, Kymlicka 
notes that the state’s policies and institutions can never be wholly culturally neutral, and that 
minority rights accordingly remain necessary. In his view, there are many areas of social and 
political life in which state policies and institutions cannot but favour some cultures over 
others (Kymlica, 1995, p.113). For example, within societies that harbour cultural 
communities with different languages, he notes that states often have to choose particular 
languages to govern their affairs as there are practical limits to the number of languages that 
can be used in parliament, schools, the court, et cetera (Kymlicka, 2002, p.346). He goes on 
to note that the fact that that majority culture’s language is usually singled out for these 
purposes gives their members a significant advantage over members of minority cultures with 
different languages. One important reason why this is so, is that much of the available work 
in society will require proficiency in the majority’s language. 
     Other examples that Kymlicka gives of the unavoidability of the state’s cultural bias 
pertain to its decisions over e.g. its “internal boundaries, public holidays, and […] symbols”. 
According to Kymlicka, even if states can remake these decisions in ways that are more 
sensitive to the prevailing cultural diversity within society, they will still involve 
“recognising , accommodating, and supporting the needs and identities of particular ethnic 
and national groups” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.115). From this, he concludes that minority rights 
are indispensable as a means of compensating cultural communities for the majority bias of 
state policies and institutions. 
  
2.2 Internal Restrictions and External Protections 
At this point, it should be noted that Kymlicka imposes an important restriction on the usage 
of minority rights. According to his strategy, minority rights should not be employed to 
curtail the individual freedom of members of cultural communities. Instead, these rights are 
only believed to be legitimate insofar as they lead to greater intercultural equality, that is, 
insofar as they provide what Kymlicka terms “external protections” from the majority bias of 
state policies and institutions (Kymlicka, 1995, p.7). “A liberal view”, he thus notes, 
“requires freedom within the minority group, and equality between the minority and majority 
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groups” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.152; original emphases). This means, amongst other things, that 
whilst e.g. the Pueblo Indians in North America have the right to govern themselves 
according to Kymlicka’s theory, they are not allowed to use their self-government rights to 
refuse housing benefits to religious converts, or to discriminate against their members in 
other ways (Kymlicka, 1989, pp.195-6).  
     The reason why Kymlicka believes that it is illegitimate for minority cultures to use 
group-differentiated rights as a means of constraining their members’ individual freedom, i.e. 
to impose on them what he calls “internal restrictions” (1995, p.7), is that these restrictions 
impede their members’ personal autonomy – the principal value that minority rights ought to 
promote in his view. As Kymlicka puts it, the problem with internal restrictions is that they 
prevent a person from choosing “the life she thinks is best for her from a rich array of 
possibilities offered by the cultural structure” (Kymlicka, 1989, pp.170-1).13   
    But if Kymlicka holds that internal restrictions cannot be justified from a liberal viewpoint, 
then how should the state deal with illiberal practices of minority cultures that by their very 
nature impose these kinds of restrictions? Considering the fact that he sees personal 
autonomy a prerequisite of a good or valuable human life, one would expect him to advocate 
state interference with these practices. However, this is not the case – at least not in all cases. 
Whereas state interference is thought to be required if a culture’s practices lead to “gross and 
systematic violations of human rights, such as slavery or genocide or mass torture and 
expulsions” (1995, p.169), Kymlicka notes that less harmful cultural practices of particular 
kinds of cultural communities ought to be exempted from state interference. These 
exemptions apply to “national-minorities”, by which he means previously self-governing, 
territorially concentrated cultures such as those of the Quebecois, Puerto Ricans, and Native-
American tribes. According to Kymlicka, the fact that national-minorities were once 
politically independent, and often became incorporated in the state against their will (e.g. 
through conquest) renders it illegitimate for the state to interfere with their illiberal practices 
                                                 
13
 Kymlicka adds to this that tolerating internal restrictions goes against “the very reason we had for being 
concerned with cultural membership – that it allows for meaningful individual choice” (Kymlicka, 1989, 
pp.170-1) Elsewhere, he concedes that it will not always be easy to determine whether a given minority right is 
used as an internal restriction or external protection as “laws that are justified in terms of external protection can 
open the door to internal restrictions" (Kymlicka, 1995, p.43). An example of this he mentions are the calls for 
group-libel laws by some Muslim communities after the publication of Salman Rushdie’s Satanic verses.  “As 
the example of Rushdie himself suggests”, Kymlicka writes, “there is reason to think that some Muslim leaders 
seek such laws primarily to control apostasy within the Muslim community, rather than to control the expression 
of non-Muslims” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.43). 
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as long as these do not give rise to “gross and systematic violations of human rights” 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p.169).
14
  
     By contrast, Kymlicka’s theory seems to allow for state interference with the illiberal 
practices of communities of recent immigrants or what he terms “ethnic groups” – 
irrespective of whether these practices give rise to “gross and systematic violations of human 
rights”. What justifies this difference in treatment, Kymlicka explains, is that members of 
ethnic groups have normally chosen to uproot themselves, and can therefore be justly 
required to adhere to the liberal norms of their host society (Kymlicka, 1995, pp.95-6).  
   At this point, it should be noted that the fact that Kymlicka does not allow the liberal state, 
except in extreme cases, to interfere with the internal affairs of national-minorities does not 
mean that it should not do anything against their illiberal cultural practices. In his view, 
liberal states have a duty to non-coercively stimulate liberal reform within these groups.
15
  To 
do this, he suggest that they should use the kinds of  measures that are employed in the 
international arena to liberalise foreign states, including offering economic benefits in 
exchange for liberal reform, and supporting progressive factions within illiberal groups 
(Kymlicka, 1995, pp.168-9).
16
 
     To summarise, we have seen that Kymlicka’s strategy tries to remedy the illiberal 
practices of illiberal minority cultures in order to create a “fully liberal society”, but that the 
kinds of measures that he considers appropriate to do so vary depending on the nature of the 
community involved (i.e. on whether it is a national-minority or ethnic group). Whilst 
Kymlicka does not discuss how the state should remedy the illiberal practices of ethnic 
groups, the contrast he draws with the way the state should respond to illiberal practices of 
national-minorities, along with the fact that ethnic groups are required to adhere to the liberal 
norms of their host society on his account, suggests that relatively militant measures are 
legitimate in their case, and perhaps even required. 
 
                                                 
14
 Related to this, Kymlicka  (1995, p.165) notes that  liberals should be as reluctant to intervene in foreign 
states as to intervene in national-minorities. 
15
 Kymlicka admits that the boundary between coercive and non-coercive measures can be blurry, but that a 
meaningful distinction can be drawn nonetheless (Kymlicka, 1995, p.169). 
16
 According to Kymlicka, an advantage of these non-coercive measures is that the liberal reform they may 
produce is likely to be more enduring than if more militant measures are used (Kymlicka, 1995, p.168).   
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2.3 Objections  
This section raises a pragmatic and principled objection to Kymlicka’s strategy for dealing 
with illiberal cultural practices. First, I will suggest that this strategy’s attempts to liberalise 
minority cultures are likely to be ineffective in many cases, as they carry a high risk of 
sparking conservative backlashes amongst these groups. Next, I will focus on a deeper 
problem with this approach. As it shall be argued, Kymlicka’s attempts to liberalise cultural 
communities do not give sufficient protection to the individual freedom (which is construed 
as personal autonomy or freedom 2 for reasons discussed earlier) of conservative members of 
illiberal minority cultures. My conclusion is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights 
strategy does better in this respect, thereby rendering it the preferred strategy from a liberal 
perspective. 
 
2.3.1 Reactive Culturalism 
The pragmatic problem that arises for Kymlicka’s strategy is that its attempts to liberalise 
minority cultures threaten to be ineffective. The reason is that state attempts to change a 
cultural community’s lifestyle often spark a conservative backlash amongst its members, a 
phenomenon that Shacher has termed “reactive culturalism”  (Shachar, 2001. pp.35-6). 
Distinctive of this backlash is that the members of these groups start cultivating their 
culture’s most orthodox elements. During this process, as Anne Phillips describes, they 
rediscover or simply invent cultural traditions, and restore “practices that have long been 
contested […] to a central defining role” (Phillips, 2005, p.114). In the case of Kymlicka’s 
strategy, this would mean that minority cultures will become more illiberal, or at the very 
least remain unaffected by the attempts of this approach to steer them into a progressive 
direction. 
    Whilst I will suggest later that Kymlicka’s ambition to liberalise cultural communities is 
problematic from a liberal viewpoint independent of whether he succeeds in doing so, my 
aim here is to show that liberals who disagree still have reason to resist his approach on 
pragmatic grounds, or at least in certain cases. In order do this, however, we first need a 
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better understanding of the phenomenon of reactive culturalism. With this aim in mind, let us 
consider an example of reactive culturalism and look at its main causes.  
   A good example of reactive culturalism can be found in the revalorisation of the Hindu 
practice of Sati within British India, a funeral ritual whereby a widow would immolate 
herself on her husband’s funeral pyre. Whilst the practice of Sati, as Uma Narayan describes, 
had almost become extinct when the Britons arrived in India, it nevertheless gained the status 
of a “central component of Indian culture” amongst Hindu communities after the British 
colonists banned it (Narayan, 1998, p.93). Even Indian reformers who had initially opposed 
Sati, Naryan notes, began to champion it as a “lofty symbol ideal of Indian womanhood, 
indicating a feminine nobility and devotion to family deemed uncharacteristic of Western 
women” (Narayan, 1998, pp.93-4). Since the practice of Sati had virtually disappeared when 
the British colonised India, it seems plausible to assume that the cultivation of this practice 
was at least partly the product of a conservative backlash against the British colonisers. That 
is, it seems that an important reason why Sati achieved its emblematic status, is that it offered 
Hindu communities a medium through which to protest against the British interference with 
their affairs. If true, Sati constitutes an example of a practice that under the influence of 
reactive culturalism is rediscovered by members of a cultural community and restored to a 
central defining role.  
   Now, in order to see why Kymlicka’s strategy seems particularly prone to reactive 
culturalism, it is important to highlight some of its main causes. We have already encountered 
one reason why a cultural community may resort to reactive culturalism, namely that it offers 
these groups a channel to express their frustration with the state’s attempts to change their 
ways of living. It seems that this is particularly likely to happen when a cultural community 
has suffered, or continues to suffer, oppression at the hands of the state. The assumption here 
is that a history of (continued) oppression can be expected to provoke feelings of mistrust and 
resentment towards the state that render it more likely that members of a given cultural 
community will respond defiantly to state interference. 
    Another reason why members of cultural communities may resort to reactive culturalism, 
is that they fear that state attempts to change their lifestyle pose a threat to the group’s 
survival. These fears may be justified or not. Sometimes there seems to be an objective threat. 
For example, minority cultures that are very low in numbers, and that do not receive group-
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differentiated rights as compensation for the majority bias of the state’s policies and 
institutions (see section 2.1), may be under substantial pressure to assimilate into the majority 
culture. However, fears of cultural extinction may also be inflated; it is certainly not 
uncommon for conservative members of cultural communities to exaggerate the danger to 
survival that is posed by state attempts to change their cultural lifestyle (indeed there may be 
no danger at all). Spreading these fears may be a tool to gain support for their orthodox 
interpretations of the group’s beliefs and practices, as people who believe that their culture 
community is under an existential threat seem more likely to become conservative. 
     Having looked an example of reactive culturalism and highlighted some of its main 
causes, it should be asked why Kymlicka’s strategy seems particularly prone to reactive 
culturalism. The short answer is that this approach, unlike the substantive exit rights strategy 
I will expound in chapter 4, does not allow for any conditions under which illiberal minority 
cultures would be free from state attempts to liberalise them. To be sure, the fact that 
Kymlicka only allows the state to use non-coercive measures to stimulate liberal reform 
amongst national-minorities seems to render (perceived) threat to their survival smaller than 
in the case of ethnic groups. Even so, there seems a real possibility that the former’s members 
will resort to reactive culturalisms as well. By trying to purge national-minorities of their 
illiberal elements, many of their members may feel – and quite rightly it appears - that the 
state is trying to reduce their cultural community to a “matter of colourful dances and rituals”, 
even if it does not use militant means to meet this objective (Kukathas,1992, p.122). If this is 
so, then these feelings can be reasonably expected to bolster conservative attitudes within 
these groups, especially if they have been oppressed by the state, or continue to be oppressed 
by it. 
In conclusion, it should be conceded that my favoured substantive exit rights strategy 
comes with a risk of reactive culturalism as well. Indeed, it seems that any liberal strategy 
that advocates state interference with the (internal) affairs of cultural communities under 
certain conditions will do so. Important is to note that this risk is not always unacceptable 
from a liberal point of view. To see why not, notice that granting cultural communities a 
carte blanche to reign over their members as they see fit is incompatible with virtually all 
currents of liberalism. The reason is, of course, that such a laissez-faire approach will 
condemn many individuals to highly oppressive lives as cultural communities will be free to 
trample on their members’ basic rights and liberties. If this is so, then it seems that the risk of 
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reactive culturalism is sometimes a price worth paying for liberals in order to protect people’s 
individual freedom.  
  Though the substantive exit rights strategy proposed by this dissertation also carries a risk 
of reactive culturalism, then, I want to suggest that this risk is acceptable from a liberal point 
of view, whilst the risk of reactive culturalism to which Kymlicka’s strategy is exposed is 
not. In order to vindicate this claim, I will argue in the next subsection that even if 
Kymlicka’s strategy successfully remedies the illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures, 
his approach still does not appropriately protect the individual freedom of some of their 
members. Since liberals ought to give equal concern to the liberty of all individuals (or at 
least all citizens), this is an unacceptable outcome from a liberal viewpoint. Or so I will 
claim. 
 
2.3.2 Protecting Personal Autonomy: The Need for Substantive Exit Rights 
This subsection claims that Kymlicka’s attempts to liberalise illiberal minority cultures fail to 
appropriately protect the individual freedom of these groups’ conservative members. For the 
reasons discussed at the outset of this chapter, individual freedom is construed here as 
personal autonomy (freedom 2). After showing how the personal autonomy of conservative 
members of illiberal minority cultures is neglected by Kymlicka’s strategy, I will answer two 
possible rebuttals to this claim. My conclusion is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights 
strategy not only better protects the individual freedom of conservative members of illiberal 
minority cultures than Kymlicka’s approach, but that it also takes a fairer position vis-à-vis 
their personal autonomy and that of dissident members, thus rendering it the preferred 
strategy from a liberal point of view. 
2.3.2.1 Personal Autonomy of Conservative Members   
Before looking at how Kymlicka’s strategy infringes on the personal autonomy of 
conservative members of illiberal minority cultures, it is necessary to clarify the distinction 
between conservative and dissident members. 
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Conservative and Dissident Members 
This dissertation defines conservative members of illiberal minority cultures as those 
members who endorse many, if not most of their culture’s illiberal practices. ‘Endorse’ here 
means that they support these practices because they subscribe to their underlying illiberal 
norms and values rather than from mere custom. Since it will normally be an important goal 
in the lives of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures to act upon their culture’s 
illiberal tenets, many of them can be said to uphold an illiberal conception of the good on this 
account. 
      In contrast, I will use the term ‘dissident members’ to refer to members of illiberal 
minority cultures who want their cultural community to liberalise in important respects. The 
reason why dissident members may want their cultural community to become more 
progressive varies. Some will maintain that their culture’s illiberal practices are at odds with 
the group’s true tenets, which, in their view, are (more) liberal. For example, some feminists 
within Muslim communities see gender inequality a deviation from rather than an expression 
of Islam. Alternatively, dissident members may consider their cultural community’s illiberal 
practices simply as morally problematic aspects of their culture.  
    Two further points about my conservative/dissident members distinction are in place. 
Firstly, despite the fact that virtually all (illiberal) cultural communities harbour a 
conservative and dissident subgroup, the ratio of conservative/dissident members may vary 
across them. Though one might think that dissident members will generally, if not always, 
constitute a minority, this not guaranteed; it is at least conceivable that illiberal minority 
cultures exist in which a wide variety of illiberal practices are observed even though only a 
fraction of the members uphold an illiberal conception of the good. Inasmuch as this fraction 
is comprised of members of the cultural elite, this does not seem impossible. Secondly, both 
conservative and dissident subgroups within illiberal minority cultures may include 
individuals who are subordinated by their community’s illiberal practices, as well as those 
who are not, or only marginally subordinated. Accordingly, dissident members of illiberal 
minority cultures need not always have their free and equal status negated by their culture’s 
illiberal practices, and conservative members need not always be (largely) free from this kind 
of subordination. 
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How Kymlicka’s Strategy Undermines the Personal Autonomy of Conservative Members  
Having clarified my distinction between conservative and dissident members, we can now 
turn to the question of how Kymlicka’s strategy undermines the personal autonomy of 
conservative members of illiberal minority cultures. The short answer is that by remedying 
the illiberal practices of these groups, this strategy makes it very difficult for their 
conservative members, if not practically impossible, to live in accordance with their illiberal 
conceptions of the good (this applies in particular to conservative members of ethnic groups 
as Kymlicka, we saw earlier, seems to go farthest to remedy the illiberal practices of these 
kinds of cultural communities; I will say more about this below). To see that their personal 
autonomy is hindered, recall that to live autonomously, one should be able to act upon one’s 
conception of the good life (see section 1.1).  
    Let me illustrate this with an example. In section 2.2, we saw that Kymlicka is unwilling to 
tolerate the custom of the Pueblo Indian tribe to deny religious converts access to housing 
benefits. Whilst it is not clear what specific measures his strategy proposes to remedy this 
form of religious discrimination, it seems that whatever the measures are, they will render it 
more difficult for the tribe’s conservative members to live in accordance with their illiberal 
conceptions of the good. Though this may sound excessive, notice that that these individuals 
may be profoundly convinced that it is morally wrong to support converts; this may be 
because they see conversion as a sin, or because they believe that those who convert to 
another religion betray the community, or because of some other reason. If I am right about 
this, then it seems a real possibility that the attempts of Kymlicka’s state to liberalise the 
Pueblo Indian tribe will pressure their conservative members to act against some of their most 
deeply held beliefs. 
    As already suggested, how difficult it will be for conservative members of illiberal 
minority cultures to act upon their illiberal beliefs will depend on the kind of cultural 
community of which they are part. For conservative members of national-minorities (e.g. 
various Native-American tribes), it seems that the difficulties will be relatively small as 
Kymlicka is only willing to take non-coercive measures to liberalise their cultural 
communities such as offering financial benefits in exchange for liberal reform and supporting 
their progressive factions, provided that they do not engage in gross and systematic violations 
of human right (see section 2.2). By contrast, for conservative members of ethnic groups, it 
could become very difficult to live illiberally and in some cases perhaps even practically 
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impossible as Kymlicka seems willing to use more militant measures to remedy their illiberal 
practices than the illiberal practices of national-minorities. Insofar as their members would 
lose social benefit, face prosecution, et cetera if they were to maintain their illiberal practices, 
this would undoubtedly make it very burdensome for conservative members of these groups 
to act on their illiberal beliefs, and thus to exercise their personal autonomy. However, I want 
to make a stronger claim, namely that even the non-coercive measures that Kymlicka’s 
strategy advocates to remedy the illiberal practices of national minorities can be understood 
to undermine the personal autonomy of their conservative members. I realise that this is a 
controversial claim, so let me answer some possible objections. 
     First, those who subscribe to a strictly negative conception of individual freedom may 
contest my assumption that raising the costs of pursuing an option x should be construed as a 
restriction on a person’s liberty to do x. Though this topic is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, it is suffice to say that I suspect they would be wrong to do so. If, for example, a 
Nazi guard threatens to kill my family unless I do x, it seems wildly implausible to say that 
the costs of not doing x do not restrict my freedom to not do x.       
     Yet, even those who are willing to grant that the costs of x may affect my freedom to do x 
– and this brings me to the second objection - may still find it hyperbolic to say that using 
non-coercive measures to liberalise cultural communities undermines the personal autonomy 
of their conservative members. For them, merely revoking, say, the tax benefits of Catholic 
communities if they refuse to ordain women as priests does not undermine the ability of 
conservative Catholics to live autonomously, even if this measure makes it (somewhat) more 
difficult for them to act on their illiberal beliefs. The reason for this is that, despite the 
financial consequences of refusing to ordain women as priests, members of Catholic 
communities would still have enough freedom to maintain this illiberal practice. 
   I believe that this rebuttal is also unsatisfactory; the fact that state attempts to liberalise 
cultural and religious groups merely discourage their conservative members from living 
illiberally rather than prevent them from doing so does not mean that they do not undermine 
their personal autonomy. Indeed, given that these non-coercive measures make it more 
difficult for them to live in accordance with their conceptions of the good, it seems more 
plausible to maintain that they do undermine their ability to live autonomously.  
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Two Replies 
Having suggested that the attempts by Kymlicka’s strategy to liberalise illiberal minority 
cultures undermine the personal autonomy of their conservative members, it is important to 
discuss two possible replies. The first of these replies states that this strategy does not so 
much undermine the ability of conservative members to live self-directed lives as well as 
promote it. The second reply concedes that the personal autonomy of conservative members 
is undermined by Kymlicka’ strategy, but maintains that this is a necessary evil from a liberal 
point of view. 
 
Reply 1 
First, a critic might argue that by liberalising illiberal minority cultures – regardless of how it 
is done - Kymlicka’s strategy actually promotes the personal autonomy of their subordinated 
conservative members. The assumption here is that people who are autonomous, and thus 
free from coercion, brainwashing, indoctrination, et cetera, would never want their free and 
equal status to be denied by their cultural community. Accordingly, by remedying the 
illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures, the state may actually be thought to promote 
the personal autonomy of subordinated conservative members of illiberal minority cultures 
by ensuring that they will live the kinds of lives, or at least come closer to living the kinds of 
lives, that they would want to live if they were untainted by the above autonomy-inhibiting 
influences.  
      There are two problems with this view. First it is anything but clear that people’s personal 
autonomy is better served if the state ignores their actual preferences regarding the good. 
Even if conservative members of illiberal minority cultures would endorse the liberal values 
promoted by Kymlicka’ state if they were autonomous, it does not follow from this that 
imposing these values on them is beneficial to their personal autonomy. The reason is, of 
course, that in order to live autonomously, one has to act on one’s actual conception of the 
good rather than on the conception that an idealised self would endorse. If this does not 
occur, then there is not much self-direction or self-government taking place. 
     Second, it is implausible to suppose that people who are subordinated by their culture’s 
illiberal practices will only want to maintain these practices if they are heteronomous. Insofar 
as value pluralism is true as many believe these days (cf. Berlin 2002, Galston 2002, Crowder 
2007), that is, if there are multiple – in some cases incommensurable - values in human life, 
  
 
 
37 
then it seems absurd to suppose that autonomous people will always want to live a liberal life, 
even if they are subordinated within their cultural community. Furthermore, even if these 
subordinated individuals want their cultural community to become more liberal, it seems that 
they may reasonably trade-off the core liberal values of freedom and equality for other values 
such as a feeling of solidarity or common-spiritedness amongst the group’s members when 
their demands clash. 
      Of course, the critic may argue that the only reason why people independently endorse 
cultural practices that subordinate them is that they have adapted their preferences to their 
subordinate status, and that this adaption prevents them from living autonomous lives. The 
problem with this response is that it is anything but clear that adapted preferences are 
incompatible with personal autonomy. Even the most independent, self-directing amongst us 
– those who live a Millean or Emersonian life in which they regularly put their beliefs and 
values to Socratic scrutiny, and act upon the outcome of this reflection - seem to adapt their 
preferences to the option that are available to them. Yet, we do not want to say that they are 
not autonomous.  
    At this point, the critic may rebut that only people who have adapted their preferences to a 
severely limited and thus non-meaningful set of options will independently endorse lives in 
which their free and equal status is denied. From this, she may conclude that subordinated 
members of illiberal minority cultures cannot really live autonomous lives. 
     I believe that this response is unsatisfactory as well. This is because it fails to explain why 
it is not uncommon for people who grew up in a (more or less) liberal milieu to join strongly 
illiberal cultural communities that they know will severely constrain their freedom once they 
become members. One might think of women in Western-European countries who leave 
mainstream society for a life in a Salafist community. The reason why these cases challenge 
the above response is that it is difficult to maintain that the women in question lack a 
meaningful set of options; in order to see this, notice they have at least two relevantly 
different options: remaining a member of the mainstream society, or joining a strongly 
illiberal minority culture. 
    Though a lot more is to be said about these issues, I think that the above considerations 
give us good reason to be sceptical of the idea that people who endorse their cultural 
community’s illiberal practices are necessarily heteronomous, even if these practices negate 
their free and equal status. 
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Reply 2  
The critic’s second reply to the claim that Kymlicka’s strategy undermines the personal 
autonomy of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures does not deny that this 
undermining occurs, but attempts to justify it. According to this reply, the restrictions that 
Kymlicka’s strategy imposes on their individual freedom are necessary to protect the personal 
autonomy of the dissident members of illiberal minority cultures, in particular the personal 
autonomy of dissident members who are subordinated by their culture’s illiberal practices. 
The worry here is that unless the state takes measures to liberalise illiberal minority cultures, 
many vulnerable individuals (often women, homosexuals, and apostates) will be condemned 
to oppressive lives.      
   Whilst this argument has some merit, it does not seem to have enough substance to justify 
state attempts to liberalise these groups, at least not to the extent Kymlicka intends. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I want to explain why this is so and show that this dissertation’s 
substantive exit rights strategy strikes a fairer balance between the colliding liberties of 
conservative members and dissident members of illiberal minority cultures than Kymlicka’s 
strategy. 
 
2.3.2.2 The Need for Substantive Exit Rights 
It is undoubtedly true that the personal autonomy of dissident members of illiberal minority 
cultures is best served by Kymlicka’s strategy (supposing that its measures are effective), or 
at least better served than by strategies that do not try to create a “fully liberal society”. By 
liberalising cultural communities, this strategy ensures that dissident members do not have to 
put up with the illiberal cultural practices that they reject, nor try to change them, or escape 
them through a cultural exit. Rather, they would be able, or at least be more likely to be able 
than on alternative liberal strategies, to live in accordance with their (more) progressive 
beliefs within their cultural community. 
     The problem with this approach, however, is that it imposes excessive constraints on the 
personal autonomy of the conservative members of illiberal minority cultures. As we saw 
earlier, the attempts of Kymlicka’s state to liberalise cultural communities leave these 
individuals no freedom to partake in an illiberal cultural community without facing state 
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interference. This, it was noted, constitutes a substantial restriction on their ability to act upon 
their illiberal conceptions of the good, and thus to live self-directed lives.  
      Now, it seems that if the state’s only options were to liberalise illiberal minority cultures 
as Kymlicka proposes, or not to interfere with their internal affairs at all, it would be unclear 
what it should do from a liberal viewpoint. Given that the individual freedom of a 
conservative and a dissident member matters equally for liberals (or should matter equally), 
both options seem unattractive. Whilst liberalising cultural communities seem to favour the 
liberty of dissident members over that of conservative members, imposing no constraints on 
their internal affairs at all (with the possible exception of requiring them to respect their 
members’ exit rights; I will say more about this in the next chapter) would favour the liberty 
of conservative members over that of dissident members. 
 
The Substantive Exit Rights Strategy 
There is, however, another way of responding to the illiberal practices of illiberal minority 
cultures – one that is free from the above biases, or at least more likely to be free from them 
than Kymlicka’s approach. This response is offered by this dissertation’s substantive exit 
rights strategy. In a nutshell, what this strategy prescribes is that the state should not interfere 
with the illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their members unless 
this is necessary (i) to secure substantive exit rights for citizens, or (ii) to protect children 
from exposure to severely harmful cultural practices (section 4.1 looks as at these conditions 
in detail). 
    The reason why this strategy strikes a fairer balance between the personal autonomy of 
conservative and dissident members than Kymlicka’s strategy, is that each of these parties is 
given a realistic ability to live autonomous lives. By tolerating illiberal cultural practices 
under the conditions specified above, it gives their conservative members room to be illiberal 
within their cultural community, something which Kymlicka’s approach does not give them. 
At the same time, this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy makes it possible for 
dissident members to live in accordance with their (more) progressive conceptions of the 
good. It does this by guaranteeing these individuals substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a 
realistic ability to change cultural affiliations. The rationale of these rights is to ensure that if 
dissident members are unable and/or unwilling to persuade their fellow members to abandon 
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or tone down (some of) the culture’s illiberal practices, they still have a realistic opportunity 
to join the liberal majority culture in which they could act on their (more) progressive beliefs.  
    Important here is to note that just as the substantive exit rights strategy’s restricted 
toleration of illiberal cultural practices renders it more difficult for dissident members to live 
autonomously than it would be if the strategy were to remedy these practices as Kymlicka’s 
approach does, the measures it proposes to secure substantive exit rights render it more 
difficult for conservative members to exercise their personal autonomy. This is because the 
implementation of these measures restricts the range of permissible illiberal cultural 
practices. However, just as tolerating certain kinds of illiberal practices of illiberal minority 
cultures is necessary in order to protect the personal autonomy of conservative members, 
restricting the range of tolerable illiberal cultural practices is indispensable in order to protect 
the personal autonomy of dissident members. To see why this is so, notice that without 
substantive exit rights, dissident members of illiberal minority cultures will lack a meaningful 
opportunity to escape exposure to illiberal cultural practices that they cannot in good 
conscience endorse, and that may condemn them to oppressive lives (more will be said about 
this in section 3.3). 
 
A Fair(er) Trade-off?  
One may doubt, of course, whether this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy makes 
the trade-off between the personal autonomy of conservative and dissident members of 
illiberal minority cultures in a fair way. Some critics are likely to argue that conservative 
members have to give in too much, whereas other critics are likely to l maintain that the 
dissident members are unfairly disadvantaged by this approach. Whether these critiques are 
warranted will depend largely on how ‘fairness’ is defined, which is an issue I cannot go into 
here due to space constraints. Let me just note that from a liberal viewpoint, fairness cannot 
mean that the trade-off is supposed to serve the interests of the majority, or to lead to the 
greatest happiness or utility. Whilst these may be side-effects of the way in which liberals 
adjudicate the conflict between conservative members and dissident members, they can never 
be the aim of this adjudication. Instead, what is essential from a liberal perspective is that 
each individual has an opportunity to act on her conception of the good.  
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   Admittedly, this response is still ambiguous. Most importantly, what remains unclear is 
whether citizens should merely have sufficient opportunity to act on their conception of the 
good, or whether they should also have (broadly) equal opportunity to do so – assuming that 
these goals are not mutually exclusive.  
     I do not wish to commit myself here to either the strictly sufficientarian option or the more 
inclusive egalitarian option. The reason is that that my argument does not depend upon it. To 
see why not, recall that I am claiming that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy 
strikes a fairer balance between the personal autonomy of conservative members and 
dissident members than Kymlicka’s approach, not that it strikes a (perfectly) fair balance. In 
order to argue for the former, I merely have to show that this strategy is more likely to meet 
the minimum requirement of giving conservative members and dissident members sufficient 
opportunity to act on their conceptions of the good than Kymlicka’s strategy. Since I have 
already shown that it is more likely to give conservative members of illiberal minority 
cultures sufficient opportunity to act on their conceptions of the good by allowing these 
groups room to be internally illiberal, what remains to be done is to show that this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy does not restrict the individual freedom of 
dissident members as much as Kymlicka’s strategy restricts the liberty of conservative 
members. For if this were the case, then given that the individual freedom of dissident 
members and conservative members matters equally from a liberal viewpoint, the former 
would not be an improvement. 
    Whilst (un)freedom is difficult to measure, it seems to me that that this dissertation’s 
substantive exit rights strategy does not require a comparable sacrifice of the personal 
autonomy of dissident members. As we will see in section 4.2, this strategy advocates far-
reaching measures to ensure that dissident members have a realistic ability to join the liberal 
majority culture in which they can live in accordance with their (more) liberal conceptions of 
the good. These include e.g. making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for 
children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that 
the liberal majority culture is open to ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. Taking this 
fact into account, it seems clear that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy gives 
dissident members more opportunity to live in accordance with their conceptions of the good 
than Kymlicka’s strategy, which, it should be recalled, does not allow for any conditions 
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under which conservative members would be free from state pressure to abandon their 
illiberal cultural lifestyles. 
     If true, it can be concluded that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy strikes a 
fairer balance between the personal autonomy of conservative members and dissident 
members of illiberal minority cultures than Kymlicka’s strategy. Given that the individual 
freedom of these subgroups matters equally from a liberal perspective, this seems to render 
this strategy the preferred liberal approach.  
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3. Kukathas’ Plain Exit Rights Strategy 
The aim of this chapter is to assess Chandran Kukathas’ liberal strategy for dealing with 
illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures. Unlike Kymlicka’s approach, this strategy 
allows cultural communities considerable room to be internally illiberal – indeed, they can 
impose any restriction on their members’ freedom as long as they refrain from doing one 
thing: forcefully preventing their members from leaving (Kukathas, 2003, p.76). This chapter 
claims that whilst Kukathas is right to resist Kymlicka’s attempts to liberalise cultural 
communities, liberals should nonetheless reject his laissez-faire approach. The reason, as we 
will see, has to do with the fact that Kukathas’ strategy fails to guarantee substantive exit 
rights to dissident members of illiberal minority cultures. This is problematic, because unless 
these members have a realistic exit option from their cultural community, their individual 
freedom is not appropriately protected. My conclusion is that, in order to give due protection 
to the individual freedom of both dissident members and conservative members of illiberal 
minority cultures, we require a strategy that secures substantive exit rights. 
    Before looking at Kukathas’ strategy, it should be noted that I will not assess this strategy 
– as I did with Kymlicka’s approach in the previous chapter – on its ability to protect 
citizens’ personal autonomy or freedom 2. Instead, Kukathas’ strategy will be assessed on its 
ability to protect the more negative kind of liberty described by freedom 1 (i.e. the ability to 
endorse, and act on, one’s conception of the good’). To reiterate: the difference between these 
two kinds of individual freedom is that freedom 1, unlike freedom 2, does not require a 
person to endorse his conception of the good independently, that is, free from autonomy-
inhibiting influences (see section 1.1).  
    My motivation for using freedom 1 as a touchstone for Kukathas’ strategy, is that it allows 
us to assess this approach on its own terms (as I will suggest below, freedom 1 is broadly 
equivalent to the kind of liberty Kukathas intends to protect). This is important because the 
aim of this dissertation is to show that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy is the 
preferred strategy from a liberal viewpoint regardless of whether one thinks that the state 
should protect freedom 1 or 2. However, this will only be possible if I can persuasively argue 
that it better protects freedom 1 than the main rival strategy proposed by Kukathas. 
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    In order to show that assessing Kukathas’ strategy on its ability to protect freedom 1 
indeed allows us to evaluate this approach on its own terms, let us compare freedom 1 and the 
kind of liberty Kukathas seeks to protect. For Kukathas, it is people’s ability to live in 
“accordance with the demands of conscience” that merits state protection, whereby 
conscience is not just seen as what guides our conduct, but as “what we think should guide 
us” (Kukathas, 2003, p.48; 114; original emphasis). This ability, it should be noted, also 
forms the central element of freedom 1; as we saw in section 1.1, to be able to act on one’s 
conception of the good, people need to be able to follow the set of beliefs they think should 
guide their lives. I suspect that this similarity guarantees that even if there are differences 
between freedom 1 and the type of liberty that Kukathas aims to protect, these will be small 
enough not to affect the conclusions reached about his approach (accordingly, I will use my 
notion of freedom 1 and Kukathas’ notion of freedom of conscience interchangeably).   
    In addition to assessing Kukathas’ strategy, there will be an intermezzo in this chapter. The 
aim of this intermezzo is to cast doubt on the generalisability of a side-effect that is 
commonly attributed to exit rights strategies. Many authors have suggested (cf. Raz 1995, 
p.180; Shachar, 2001; Barry 2002, p.224) that guaranteeing citizens an exit option from their 
cultural community will generally be enough to cause illiberal minority cultures to liberalise. 
In a nutshell, the idea is that if exit options are available, then leaders of cultural communities 
are likely to increase the liberty of subordinated members who are dissatisfied with their 
intra-group status in order to prevent them from leaving. If true, this would mean that 
adjustments may be necessary to exit rights strategies such as Kukathas’ and the one 
proposed by this dissertation in order to protect the individual freedom of conservative 
members of illiberal minority cultures, the reason being that these strategies would 
effectively leave these groups less room to be internally illiberal than it initially appears. In 
order to show that there is no reason to assume that these adjustments are necessary, then, it 
is essential to cast doubt on the belief that exit options will generally induce liberal reform 
amongst illiberal minority cultures.  
  
 
 
45 
3.1 Freedom of Conscience and Plain Exit Rights  
For Kukathas (2003, p.36), the kind of liberty that merits state protection is not personal 
autonomy but freedom of conscience. In his view, freedom of conscience is fundamental to 
our well-being. “If there are any basic human interests”, he writes, 
“One of these is an interest in living in accordance with the demands of conscience. For 
among the worst fates that a person might have to endures is that he be unable to avoid acting 
against conscience –that he be unable to do what he thinks is right” (Kukathas, 2003, p.114).  
By contrast, personal autonomy is not seen by Kukathas as an essential element of a good 
human life.
17
 “To think”, he notes, “that we have a basic interest in being able to assess our 
ends is a mistake; some of us have an interest in being able to do so in some circumstances – 
but no stronger claim can be made” (Kukathas, 2003, p.60; original emphases).  
    Having identified freedom of conscience as the kind of freedom that merits state 
protection, Kukathas goes on to explore how this duty is best discharged. His answer is that 
in order to protect citizens’ freedom of conscience, the state ought not to interfere with the 
internal affairs of cultural communities unless this is necessary to protect citizens’ “plain exit 
rights”, that is, their rights to a physically unobstructed departure from their cultural 
community (Kukathas, 2012, pp.36). According to Kukathas, these rights are inalienable, 
meaning that there is no (cultural) defence that can justify their violation. The reason why he 
considers them so important is that they play a crucial role in protecting people’s freedom of 
conscience. Without plain exit rights, Kukathas’ seems to believe, people will not be able to 
leave groups in which they cannot conscientiously remain, which means that their liberty of 
conscience is not appropriately protected (Kukathas, 1992, p.117; 2012, pp.38-9). 
   But not only does Kukathas’ strategy refuse cultural communities the right to forcefully 
prevent their members from leaving, it is also unwilling to grant these groups any form of 
state support to keep their members on board. A cultural community, Kukathas notes, “has 
[no] claim upon others to be given the resources to discourage their members from deserting 
its ranks” (Kukathas, 2012, p.39). In addition to this, his strategy opposes the conferral of 
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 Notice the difference with Kymlicka who does regard personal autonomy as a prerequisite of a good human 
life (see section 2.1). 
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group-differentiated rights on (marginalised) minority cultures.
18
 Whilst a cultural 
community “may use its own resources to try to sustain its traditions or customs”, Kukathas 
writes, “it cannot demand that others should value this” (Kukathas, 2012, p.39).  
   As I interpret his theory, Kukathas’ unwillingness to provide cultural communities with 
resources to discourage or prevent their members from leaving is based on the same concern 
as his unwillingness to grant them group-differentiated rights: the concern that this kind of 
support infringes on the freedom of conscience of dissident members. By helping cultural 
communities to raise the costs of a cultural exit, his thought seems to be that the state 
infringes on the freedom of conscience of dissident members. This is because it will become 
more difficult for them to leave a cultural community in which they cannot in good 
conscience remain. In a similar vein, he seems to regard the conferral of group-differentiated 
rights on cultural communities as an infringement on the freedom of conscience of dissident 
members who conscientiously object to (aspects of) their community’s current lifestyle. The 
assumption here is that these rights will help the cultural community to preserve its current 
norms and practices.   
   At the same time, however, Kukathas maintains that dissident members of illiberal minority 
cultures should not receive any public resources that may help them to change their cultural 
community’s terms of association by e.g. liberalising them. The thinking seems to be that just 
as granting minority rights infringes on the freedom of conscience of dissident members, this 
type of support infringes on the freedom of conscience of conservative members. As he puts 
it, this latter group may “dispute the claims of disaffected minorities, and fear that their own 
ways of life might be held hostage to the desires of those members who want to change it” 
(Kukathas, 2012, p.52). To avoid this, Kukathas is willing to tolerate even the most harmful 
and oppressive practices of illiberal minority cultures, provided that they respect their 
members’ plain exit rights. These include forcing women into unequal marriages, having girls 
undergo clitorectomy, and denying children an education (Kukathas, 1997, pp.70-1).  
    But not only is the state not allowed to liberalise cultural communities, Kukathas’ 
contention is that the state should also refrain from helping dissident members to leave their 
cultural community. Again, his belief seems to be that this kind of support infringes on the 
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 Again, notice the difference with Kymlicka’s theory, which assigns a duty to the state to grant group-
differentiated rights to economically and politically marginalised minority cultures (see section 2.1). 
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freedom of conscience of conservative members. “The more is done to make exit a ‘realistic’ 
possibility”, we are told, “the more the communities whose practices are the object of reform 
will rightly feel grieved that their way of life is being deliberately undermined” (Kukathas, 
2012, p.52).  
    Kukathas describes the non-interventionist position that emerges from this view as a 
“stance of neutrality” (Kukathas, 2012, p.40). Though he does not specify how “neutrality” 
should be understood in this context, I suspect that he does not just mean that his strategy, to 
use Kymlicka’s terminology (1989, p.884), is “justificatory neutral” between the interests of 
conservative members and dissident members, but also “consequentially neutral”. That is, 
Kukathas does not seem to simply mean that his position is neutral because it does not appeal 
to the interests of either conservative members or dissident members in the justification of its 
non-interventionism. Rather, he also seems to suggest that his position asks for (more or less) 
equal sacrifices from conservative and dissident members – whilst conservative members 
cannot require dissident members to remain, dissident members cannot require conservative 
members to accept their terms of association. 
     The idea that Kukathas’ strategy aims to be consequently neutral is speculation, however, 
and I would not want to be pinned down on it. By contrast, what is clear is that Kukathas 
believes that his approach best protect citizens’ freedom of conscience. In section 3.3, I will 
contest this claim. For now, it is important to consider a side-effect that is commonly 
attributed to strategies for dealing with illiberal cultural practices that recognise the right of 
exit.  
 
3.2 Do Exit Rights have a Liberalising Impact on Cultural Communities? 
In section 2.3.1, I argued that the susceptibility of Kymlicka’s strategy to reactive culturalism 
gives liberals reason to reject this approach on pragmatic grounds, or at least when the risk of 
a conservative backlash is high. My aim here is to look at a side-effect that is commonly 
attributed to Kukathas’ strategy and other liberal strategies that recognise the right of exit 
(which, it was noted, seem to include them all). Yet, unlike reactive culturalism, this side-
effect is thought to strengthen rather than weaken support for liberal values amongst illiberal 
minority cultures. As it was noted at the outset of this chapter, various authors have suggested 
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that providing citizens with the option of leaving their cultural community will generally 
cause illiberal minority cultures to liberalise. Simply put, their assumption is that when exit 
rights are available, leaders of illiberal minority cultures are likely to grant more freedom to 
subordinated members in order to prevent them from exiting.  
    This subsection argues, however, that even if this side-effect occurs in some cases, it is 
dubitable whether it occurs in all, or even most cases. It should be clear that Kukathas’ 
strategy is not challenged by this conclusion; whilst strategies have been developed for which 
it is problematic as they are built on the assumption that this side-effect occurs generally (cf. 
Shachar, 2001), this does not apply to Kukathas’ strategy. The reason, we saw in the previous 
subsection, is that it does not try to stimulate liberal reform within cultural communities 
(Kukathas, 2003, p.25).  Rather, the reason why it is important to cast doubt on the idea that 
securing exit options for citizens will generally induce liberal reform is that if this were the 
case, then exit rights strategies such as Kukathas’ and the one proposed by this dissertation 
would become susceptible to an objection that was raised to Kymlicka’s strategy in section 
2.3.2, namely that these strategies do not appropriately protect the ability of conservative 
members of illiberal minority cultures to act on their illiberal conceptions of the good. 
3.2.1 Exit Options and Liberal Reform  
Before considering why it doubtful that the availability of exit rights will generally cause 
cultural communities to liberalise, it is important to clarify how this side-effect is believed to 
occur. The basic idea is that if subordinated members of a cultural community are free to 
leave the group, and know that they are free to do so, then some of them will use the threat of 
exit as a bargaining tool to demand equal liberty. For example, female members of a 
patriarchal community may threaten to leave the group if its misogynistic practices are not 
abandoned or at least toned down. On this view, cultural elites are assumed to be responsive 
to these demands in order to avert the disruptive impact that a “mass exodus through exit” 
would have on the cultural community, meaning that they will increase the voice of 
subordinated members calling for a greater share of liberty (Reitman, 2005, p.189). This is, in 
short, how exit rights are believed to generate liberal reform within illiberal minority cultures.  
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3.2.2 Why Exit Options may Fail to Stimulate Liberal Reform 
My next aim is to cast doubt on the generalisability of this side-effect. In doing so, I am not 
claiming that this effect will never take palace; rather, I want to argue that there is good 
reason to doubt that the availability exit rights will generally cause minority cultures to 
liberalise. 
    The first assumption that should be questioned here is whether subordinated members of 
illiberal minority cultures will always, or even in most cases, use the threat of exit to demand 
equal liberty. It is certainly not uncommon for people to deliberately forego a greater share of 
liberty because they believe that this will help preserve the cohesion and feeling of solidarity 
within the community. In addition to this, there seem to be many cases where brainwashing, 
indoctrination or other forms of manipulation cause people to acquiesce to, or even actively 
support, cultural practices that subordinate them. 
    But even if subordinated members of illiberal minority cultures use the threat of exit to 
mandate liberal reform, and this brings us to the second assumption I want to question, it is 
not clear that cultural elites will generally give in to these demands. As Oonagh Reitman 
(2005, p.199) points out, leaders of cultural communities may prefer dissidents to leave if 
they fear that, by accommodating their demands for equal liberty, the community may lose its 
cultural distinctiveness
19
 and/or be morally corrupted. In these cases, the group’s size may 
not be their (main) concern. Especially in liberal multicultural societies, Reitman notes that 
cultural communities often “have little interest in bolstering numbers as such – preferring to 
soldier on with those whose commitment is beyond question (Reitman, 2005, p.199).
20
  
    Finally, even in cases where the group’s size is the cultural elite’s primary concern, liberal 
reform may be resisted simply because there are other ways of maintaining a sizable group 
rather than by increasing the individual freedom of subordinated dissidents. For example, a 
cultural community may urge its members to have more children, and create more stringent 
obstacles to exit so as to prevent younger generations from leaving the group as they grow up 
(one might think of limiting their education and shielding them from the outside world). 
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 For example, Reitman notes that the illiberal features of the Ultra-Orthodox Jewish community demarcate 
them from other factions within Judaism (Reitman, 2005, p.199). 
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 Indeed, it seems that exit options may even offer a justification for cultural communities not to liberalise; once 
these options are available, the thought is that ruling elites can tell dissident members: ‘love it or leave it’ (cf. 
Green, 1998). 
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Insofar as exiting members are seen as e.g. traitors, blackmailers and/or cultural free-riders, it 
seems likely that these ways of looking after the group’s size will often be preferred by 
cultural elites to increasing the voice of dissident members. 
    I have argued that there are good grounds to doubt that exit options will generally cause 
illiberal minority cultures to liberalise. If my argument is sound, then this means that there is 
no reason to assume that exit rights strategies such as Kukathas’ and the one proposed by this 
dissertation fail to appropriately protect to the individual freedom of their conservative 
members by liberalising these groups through the backdoor. 
 
3.3 Protecting Freedom of Conscience: The Need for Substantive Exit Rights 
This subsection claims that Kukathas’ strategy does not appropriately protect the freedom of 
conscience of dissident members of illiberal minority cultures from a liberal viewpoint. 
Though this strategy ensures that these individuals are not forcefully prevented from leaving 
their cultural community, I will argue that, in many cases, this is not enough to guarantee 
them a meaningful right of exit. If I am right about this, then the following problem emerges 
for Kukathas’ strategy: without a meaningful right of exit, we can expect that at least some 
dissident members of illiberal minority cultures will be practically condemned to living 
oppressive lives. This is because they will lack a realistic ability to leave their internally 
illiberal cultural community, and thus a realistic ability to escape exposure to (illiberal) 
practices of their cultural community that they conscientiously reject. If true, this suggests 
that their freedom of conscience is not appropriately protected by Kukathas’ strategy.  
    To redress this problem, I will argue that we need a strategy that guarantees members of 
illiberal minority cultures a realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture, that is, a 
strategy that ensures that these members are able, and know that they are able, to live a 
decent life in mainstream society (see section 1.1). It will be concluded that this strategy can 
be found, or is at least more likely to be found, in the substantive exit rights strategy proposed 
by this dissertation.  
      Before looking at Kukathas’ responses to the objection that his strategy does not 
appropriately protect the freedom of conscience of dissident members of illiberal minority 
cultures, it is important to look at the different kinds of obstacles to exit that deny at least 
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some of these individuals a meaningful right of exit. I divide these obstacles into five 
categories. In what follows, my aim is to discuss these categories by giving some examples. 
In doing so, I am not suggesting that the state should redress all examples of exit obstacles 
that I will mention – this may not even be practically feasible. Still, the next chapter shall 
argue that the state should take four measures to reduce the impact of the five main kinds of 
obstacles. These measures, we will see, are necessary in order to ensure that dissident 
members of illiberal minority cultures have a realistic ability to join the liberal majority 
culture. 
3.3.1 Five Kinds of Obstacles to Exit 
First, people may be denied a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations by what I term 
‘financial obstacles to exit’. These obstacles are created by the loss of income that may result 
from a cultural exit. For example, in communities that do not recognise private ownership 
such as that of the Hutterites
21
, members lose all of their belongings if they decide to leave. 
As Justice Pidgeon noted in the case of Hofer vs. Hofer
22
, “Even the clothes they [the 
Hutterites] are wearing belong to the colony and are to be returned to it as its property by 
anyone who ceases to be a member of the church” (Janzen in Kymlicka, 1995, p.161). It 
seems that women in strongly patriarchal cultures are particularly likely to face financial 
obstacles to exit, as many of them depend financially on their community. 
     Second, there are what Oonagh Reitman (2005) terms “socio-psychological obstacles to 
exit”. These obstacles consist of the difficulties of having to end social relationships with 
members of one’s cultural community. Though not an inherent feature of a cultural exit, it 
seems that the termination of at least some of these relationships will normally be inevitable; 
there seem to be very few cases of cultural exits, if any, where all members of a cultural 
community are willing to maintain relationships with a defector.  
    It should be noted that the foreseen loss of these relationships need not always create 
(strong) socio-psychological obstacles to exit. Sometimes, the very reason a person leaves her 
cultural community is to cut social ties with the group’s members, or at least with some of 
them. However, there are other instances of cultural exits where the termination of these 
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 An Anabaptist group that, like the Amish, fled to North-America in order to escape religious prosecution. 
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 In this case, two expelled apostates sued the Hutterite community for being denied a share of the group’s 
communal resources. 
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relationships is an unwanted side-effect. It seems that this will often be the case when 
relationships with people in one’s inner circle are affected. For example, within the Amish 
community, those who leave after their baptism are generally shunned by their family and 
friends. 
     Another example of a socio-psychological obstacle to exit is of a more abstract nature. 
This kind of obstacle is created by the loss of solidarity, sense of belonging, and common-
spiritedness that many of us, to varying degrees, derive from our cultural membership. 
Though other affiliations may compensate for this loss (e.g. sport teams, book clubs, political 
parties, et cetera), it is not clear whether compensation is always possible, and if it is, 
whether full compensation can be achieved.  
    However, it is not just these ‘self-regarding’ consequences of cultural exits that may 
prevent or discourage people from leaving. They may also be reluctant to leave because they 
feel that they have a moral obligation towards (some) members to remain with the cultural 
community. For example, a person may feel that he would let his parents or friends down if 
he were to exit. In addition to this, some people stay put because they believe that they have a 
responsibility to try to change their cultural community’s norms and practices from the 
inside. Though others may try to do this from outside the group (indeed, the very act of 
exiting may be an attempt to change the cultural community’s norms and practices), these 
individuals may hold that this is not possible, or possible only with great difficulty. 
     Third, we can distinguish what I term ‘cognitive-epistemic obstacles to exit’. These 
obstacles are created by deficits in people’s cognitive skills and/or ignorance about 
alternative cultural lifestyles. To see how a lack of cognitive skills may deny a person a 
realistic ability to exit, it should be noted that these skills are necessary in order to deliberate 
about a cultural exit. The thought is that unless a person has certain basic reasoning skills, the 
capacity to absorb and store information, the ability to assess alternatives, et cetera, this kind 
of deliberation will be practically impossible. The same holds true of course, if a person is not 
appropriately informed about alternative cultural lifestyles; without knowledge of how other 
cultural communities live, it seems that a cultural exit may not even present itself to people as 
a conceivable option (I will say more about this in section 4.2.1.2). And even if it does, fears 
for a future in a (largely) unknown cultural environment may still stifle their capacity to exit. 
    Now, it seems that these cognitive-epistemic obstacles to exit will loom particularly large 
when people are not just ignorant of alternative cultural lifestyles, but also carry negative 
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misconceptions about them. So, if e.g. Rick Santorum (a former senator in the United States) 
genuinely believes that large sections of the Dutch population are involuntarily euthanised as 
he claimed during electoral debates,
23
 and if he holds equally negative prejudices about other 
countries, then it seems that he has no realistic ability to exit the United States, even if he no 
longer wishes to live there.
 
This is because he is unlikely to be aware of the fact that he can 
live a decent life outside the United States. Whilst this is an extreme example (as well as one 
that is complicated by the fact that it involves moving to another country), it illustrates that 
having negative misconceptions about other groups can undermine people’s ability to exit 
from their own group.  
    Fourth, there are obstacles to exit that are created by the infliction of harm (which may or 
may not prevent people from leaving their cultural community) or threats thereof. An 
example of these harms can be found in the ancient Chinese tradition of foot-binding. Given 
that women with bound feet are effectively left house-bound, and therefore unable to function 
outside their home, it appears that leaving their community will normally not be a viable 
option for them. For examples of threats that undermine people’s capacity to exit, one might 
think of the issuing of Fatwas or legal decrees by Islamic scholars to kill those who leave 
particular Muslim communities (both examples will be discussed more at length in section 
4.2.2).  
    Finally, people may be denied a realistic ability to exit simply because no other community 
within society is willing to accept them as members – assuming that emigration is no viable 
option, as is often the case. Though some may think of this as an obstacle to enter into 
another cultural community rather than an obstacle to exit one’s cultural community, I believe 
that the latter interpretation is valid as well. To see why this is so, notice that people will 
normally know that no other cultural community in society is willing to receive them and that 
they consequently would have to emigrate or live as a hermit if they were to leave their 
cultural community. Since the prospect of having to emigrate or live as a hermit is daunting 
to most of us, it seems that this knowledge can reasonably be understood to undermine 
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 During a speech at the American Heartland forum in Columbia (Missouri) on 3 February 2012, Santorum 
stated that “in the Netherlands, people wear different bracelets if they are elderly. And the bracelet is: ‘Do not 
euthanise me.’ Because they have voluntary euthanasia in the Netherlands but half of the people who are 
euthanised — ten percent of all deaths in the Netherlands — half of those people are enthanised involuntarily at 
hospitals because they are older and sick”. See http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-
checker/post/euthanasia-in-the-netherlands-rick-santorums-bogus-statistics/2012/02/21/gIQAJaRbSR_blog.html 
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people’s capacity to exit. I what follows, I will therefore refer to obstacles created by the 
‘closedness’ of other cultural communities in society as ‘entrance obstacles to exit’. 
   Notice that entrance obstacles to exit may arise even in societies with liberal majority 
cultures. Though one might think that a liberal majority culture, being liberal, will admit 
citizens regardless of their cultural or religious background, my sense is that this is too 
sanguine; there seem to be many examples of liberal majority cultures that discourage 
citizens from certain cultural and religious backgrounds from integrating due to racism, 
xenophobia, or prejudices. In The Netherlands and Germany, for instance, Turkish 
immigrants and their descendants have long been discouraged (and sometimes continue to be 
discouraged) from becoming part of the liberal majority culture.  
 
3.3.2 The Need for Substantive Exit Rights  
At this point, it should be noted that Kukathas (2012, p.47) acknowledges that citizens should 
not merely be formally free to leave their cultural community, but also effectively free. He 
thus remarks that “the capacity to exit is necessary to enjoy the right of exit”, and notes in an 
earlier paper that exit rights should have a “substantive bite” (Kukathas, 1992, p.129).  On his 
account, exits right have a “substantive bite” as long as the wider society is open to people 
who leave their cultural community, that is, as long as other cultural communities in society 
are willing to accept them as members. This is not the case, he writes, in tribal societies 
where “the individual would have to choose between the conformity of the village and the 
lawlessness (and loneliness) of the heath” (Kukathas 1992, p.134).  
    It seems that Kukathas is right to argue that exit rights are only of use in an “open society”. 
As social animals, most of us need to partake in a cultural community in order to satisfy a 
wide variety of social and psychological needs. If departure from our cultural community 
makes this impossible, then exit rights seem effectively useless for the large majority of us.
24
 
Contra Kukathas, however, I believe that an open society is not enough to guarantee many 
members of liberal societies a meaningful right of exit, which, if true, would mean that some 
of these individuals may be practically forced to remain with an (internally illiberal) cultural 
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 Whilst it is possible to live as a hermit, few of us desire, and are able to cope with the social isolation that this 
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55 
community of which they cannot in good conscience be part. Before looking at the problems 
this causes from a liberal perspective, it is important to adduce evidence for my claim that 
Kukathas’ strategy does not secure meaningful exit rights for at least some (adult) citizens. 
     Earlier, I defined a person with a meaningful right of exit as one who “is able, and knows 
that she is able, to live a decent life in another cultural community” (see section 1.1). It seems 
that, if Kukathas’ strategy were implemented, many citizens would not meet the first 
criterion, and by implication, would also fail to meet the second criterion given its 
dependency on the former (in order to know that one can live a decent life outside one’s 
cultural community, one must actually be able to live such a life). What underlies this view is 
the assumption that the different kinds of obstacles to exit that were described in section 3.3.1 
will deny at least some members of illiberal minority cultures the ability to live a decent life 
outside their cultural community. For example, a women within the Amish community who 
only speaks Pennsylvania Dutch, has no income of her own, and has very little knowledge of 
life outside the community will not be able to live a decent outside her group. Indeed, as I 
will suggest in section 4.2, it seems that each of these obstacles to exit may independently 
deny her a meaningful exit right. 
     But even if the Amish woman were free from these impairments, notice that what I termed 
‘entrance obstacles to exit’ may still deny her a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations. 
Whilst Kukathas recognises the need that society be open to defectors, he does not propose 
any measures to ensure that cultural communities are willing to accept them as members 
(though one may think that the openness of society is not something the state can do anything 
about, I will suggest later that there are measures available). This leaves open the possibility, 
then, that the Amish woman may not be able to change cultural affiliations because there is 
simply no other cultural community willing to accept her as a member. 
    The upshot is that although the Amish woman is not coerced to remain with the Amish 
community, her right of exit nonetheless lacks a “substantive bite” on Kukathas’ account. 
The same applies, I suspect, to many other members of illiberal minority cultures who can be 
expected to encounter at least some of the obstacles to exit described in section 3.3.1. Whilst 
again, not all of these obstacles need to be absent in order for people to enjoy a meaningful 
right of exit, we will see in section 4.1 that the impact of some obstacles ought to be reduced 
by the state. 
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   Finally, it is important to note that one consequence of Kukathas’ extreme tolerance of 
illiberal cultural practices is that some citizens may never reach the age at which they could 
have exercised their exit rights. Because his strategy allows cultural and religious groups to 
deny their members life-saving medical treatment, it is possible that e.g. a child of Jehova 
Witnesses who is in need of a blood-transfusion will have exited her life before she will have 
had the chance to exit her cultural or religious community. 
3.3.2.1 Freedom of Conscience of Dissident Members 
If I am right that Kukathas’ strategy fails to secure a meaningful right of exit for at least some 
members of illiberal minority cultures, then the next question to ask is why this is 
problematic.  
     I believe that there are two problems from a liberal point of view. The first problem, 
which I will discuss at length in section 4.2, is that members of illiberal minority cultures 
who lack a lack a meaningful right of exit are also likely to lack a meaningful opportunity to 
take advantage of their full range of basic rights and liberties due to cultural constraints. To 
have this opportunity, the thought is that these individuals need a realistic ability to join the 
liberal majority culture as this will allow them to escape the social restrictions that their 
cultural communities, being internally illiberal, impose on them. The assumption here is that 
even if every citizen of a liberal society has the same basic rights and liberties in a legal 
sense, social pressure to forego these rights and liberties may mean that some citizens will not 
be able to take advantage of them. For example, a woman within a Salafist community may 
face stark disincentives to study, work, marry a person of the same sex, convert to another 
religion, et cetera.  
     Now, some liberals will probably argue that it does not matter if people cannot exercise 
their full range of basic rights and liberties as long as they (autonomously) endorse their 
circumscribed lives. My sense is that they would be wrong to do so; it seems that a plausible 
liberal argument can be made that, in order to ensure that citizens are not merely formally 
free but also effectively free, it is important that even those who (autonomously) endorse 
their subordinate cultural status have a meaningful opportunity to exercise their full range of 
basic rights and liberties (I will say more about this in section 4.1).  
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     The second and more serious problem with the inability of Kukathas’ strategy to secure a 
meaningful right of exit for dissident members of illiberal minority cultures, is that the 
individual freedom (understood as Kukathas’ liberty of conscience or freedom 1) of some of 
these individuals is not appropriately protected. This applies to dissidents who are practically 
forced to stay within an internally illiberal cultural community in which they cannot in good 
conscience remain. For example, we can imagine how the aforementioned Amish woman 
may come to have scruples against the subordination of women within the Amish community 
and accordingly develop a desire to exit. However, inasmuch as she lacks the economic 
wherewithal to maintain a life outside the Amish community, the qualifications and language 
skills to find a decent job, et cetera (as is not unlikely amongst Amish women), she will have 
no real choice but to put up with her group’s subordinating practices. In this case, the 
conclusion seems warranted that the woman’s freedom of conscience is not appropriately 
protected because she lacks a realistic opportunity to defect to a cultural environment in 
which she could live accordance with her (more) progressive conception of the good. 
    Of course, she could try to persuade other members of the Amish community to become 
more liberal. The problem with this approach is that especially for a woman in a patriarchal 
group, this is often extremely difficult. Lack of support from other members (in particular 
those with a high standing), as well as the absence of channels to make one’s voice heard, 
may render it practically impossible for these vulnerable individuals to reform their cultural 
communities. And even if it is possible, it should be noted that the reform is likely to be slow 
and modest. In addition to this, there is the danger of reactive culturalism. Whilst I explained 
in section 2.3.1 that reactive culturalism is usually a response to outside interference with a 
group’s affairs, notice that dissident members who want to liberalise their cultural community 
may be perceived by other members as influenced by the liberal majority culture (e.g. as 
puppets of the state or the liberal majority culture). It seems that this may already be enough 
to bolster conservative attitudes within the group. A final difficulty is that the use of “voice”, 
to put it in Hirschmanian terms, may sometimes be even costlier than a cultural exit as the 
latter does not involve a confrontation with other members (cf. Bartolini, 2005).  
    Due to these difficulties, it seems that the freedom of conscience or freedom 1 of dissident 
members of illiberal minority cultures will not be appropriately protected unless they have a 
meaningful right of exit. More specifically, what people like the Amish women need is a 
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realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture in which they can live in accordance with 
their (more) progressive conceptions of the good. Since Kukathas rejects any measures to 
secure this ability for them, it thus seems that his approach does not appropriately protect the 
individual freedom of this group. 
   To resolve the two problems faced by Kukathas’ strategy, section 4.2 will explain how the 
state can secure meaningful exit rights for members of illiberal minority cultures. Since the 
second problem seems to pose the biggest challenge to this strategy, I now want to look at 
Kukathas’ rebuttals to the claim that his exit rights are too minimalist to protect the individual 
freedom of dissident members of illiberal minority cultures. 
 
3.3.3 Kukathas’ Rebuttals 
Kukathas’ rebuttals are twofold. First, he warns that we should not understate the ability of 
members of illiberal minority cultures to leave their community (Kukaths, 2012, p.47). 
Responding to Shachar’s and Okin’s critiques that the exit opportunities for women in 
patriarchal communities are particularly bleak, he writes that “even in the most difficult 
circumstances women often acquire the capacity to exit associations or arrangements they 
dislike or abhor” (Kukathas, 2012, p.47).   
    Second, he suggests that the two methods that are commonly proposed to make an exit 
from one’s cultural community a “realistic possibility” are either ineffective or morally 
unacceptable (Kukathas, 2012, p.52).  The first method is to increase people’s “resources” 
(what these resources are remains unspecified). According to Kukathas, this method is 
ineffective because, in his view, there is a trade-off between a person’s resources and 
motivation to exit. “The poorer or less favourable one’s circumstances”, he notes, “the harder 
it is to garner the resources necessary to leave them, but the greater the incentive to get 
what’s needed and to get out” (Kukathas, 2012, p.47).25 
     There are two important assumptions here. First, when Kukathas claims that increasing 
people’s resources to exit will not bolster their ability to leave their cultural community due 
                                                 
25
 According to Kukathas, this trade-off explains why it is not uncommon for even the most vulnerable people to 
leave their cultural community – what these individuals lack in resources to exit, they make up for in motivation 
(Kukathas, 2012, p.47). 
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to the concomitant decrease in their motivation to exit, he seems to assume that there is a 
logical relationship between their motivation and ability to exit. This relationship is negative 
as a decrease in people’s motivation to exit is believed to undermine their ability to exit. The 
second assumption to which Kukathas seems to commit himself is that an increase in 
people’s resources to exit will decrease their motivation to exit to such an extent that their 
ability to leave their cultural community is not bolstered by their increased resources. 
     What follows from these assumptions is that a person’s right of exit, as Kukathas puts it, 
“can only be made more realistic by changing her desires”, that is, by increasing her 
motivation to leave her cultural community (Kukathas, 2012, p.51). However, he rejects this 
second method as well as, in his view, it is a morally problematic way of making people’s 
exit rights more realistic (2012, p.48). In order to manipulate people’s willingness to leave 
their cultural community, far-reaching state interference with their lives would be necessary 
that cannot be justified from a liberal point of view. Hence Kukathas’ claim that “the liberal’s 
task is to resist calls” on the state to “ensure that they [citizens] do not have the wrong kinds 
of preferences” (Kukathas, 2012, p.48). 
    In short, Kukathas’ rebuttals to the objection that his strategy does not appropriately 
protect the individual freedom of dissident members of illiberal minority cultures by failing 
to provide them with meaningful exit rights are that (i) we should not understate the ability of 
even the most vulnerable individuals to leave their cultural community, and that, even if 
exiting is difficult, (ii) there is no effective way in which the state can bolster citizens’ ability 
to exit that is acceptable from a liberal point of view. 
 
3.3.4 Re-Rebuttals 
My aim in this subsection is to answer Kukathas’ rebuttals. After that, I will consider a 
comeback that proponents of his strategy can make. 
3.3.4.1 Re-Rebuttal 1 
Regarding Kukathas’ first rebuttal, there certainly are cases of individuals who exit their 
communities in the most unfavourable circumstances. One might think of Protestants 
separating from the Catholic Church during the reformation, Afro-American slaves fleeing 
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the south of the United States during the antebellum, or Amish leaving their insulated 
religious group. To illustrate that exiting need not be impossible in these difficult situations, 
consider the story of a woman who left the Amish community in her early twenties. 
“I packed my things and told my mom I was going to live someplace else, she recalls ‘It was 
one of the worst things I ever had to do in my life. You know if you join the church and then 
you leave, they’ll put a ban on you. The subsequent ‘shunning’ imposed by the Amish church 
extend even to her parents and five brothers and sisters. ‘Even with my own family, I was 
allowed only to enter their house, I could not eat with them, and they are not allowed to ride 
in my car […] I was the first one in the family to leave. They wanted me back; the pressures 
on my family were great. It made it very hard on those who were left (The Lewiston Daily, 
18 April, 1985, p.20). 
This testimony suggests that even for a person who knows that her family will shun her if she 
leaves her cultural community, exiting need not be impossible. Given that cases like these are 
not uncommon, I believe that Kukathas is right to stress that we should not understate the 
ability of even the most vulnerable individuals to exit.  
    Another thing he is right about, is that people who exit illiberal minority cultures often do 
so to escape the social constraints these groups impose on them. In many cases, the prospect 
of a freer life in the liberal majority culture seems to offer these individuals a powerful 
incentive to defect. The ex-Amish woman accordingly remarks about her motivation to leave 
the Amish community that “it was simply too difficult […] to conform unquestionably to 
rigid Amish customs and beliefs that cling to the manner of worship, styles of dress, and 
traditions of centuries past” (The Lewiston Daily, 18 April, 1985, p.20).  
    That said, I believe that Kukathas is still too cavalier regarding the capacity of vulnerable 
members of illiberal minority cultures to exit. The fact that people such as the above woman 
manage to leave their community may be nothing more than false positives. That is, for each 
of these individuals, there may be several individuals who are equally vulnerable and 
motivated to exit yet who are unable to take this step. If true, we cannot infer from the fact 
that some vulnerable individuals leave their illiberal minority culture that most other 
vulnerable individuals have the capacity to do so, even if they are not physically prevented 
from leaving. To do so would be like treating the fact that some women become CEOs as 
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evidence that sexism does not, or rarely prevent women who are as qualified and motivated 
as their male competitors from reaching top positions.  
    Indeed, it is not even clear that the fact that some vulnerable individuals leave their cultural 
communities should be taken as evidence that they had meaningful exit rights at their 
moment of departure. It seems that many of these individuals simply defy the odds by 
exiting. One can liken it to a cyclist who, despite having finished last in every previous 
tournament, wins at the Olympics because her opponents fall out of the race. Though the 
cyclist won Olympic gold, the conclusion seems warranted that she did not have a realistic 
ability to do so. Similarly, it appears that people who manage to leave their cultural 
community may do so without having a realistic ability to exit – perhaps because they lack 
the economic wherewithal to maintain themselves outside their cultural community, or 
because they have been shielded from the outside world for most of their life, and/or because 
there is no other cultural community within their society willing to accept them as members. 
    Now, some will probably claim that by definition, people who managed to leave their 
cultural community must have enjoyed a meaningful right of exit at their moment of 
departure otherwise they would not have been able to go (assuming that they were not 
expelled). Though I think this is not an analytical truth, let us suppose that they are right to do 
so. In that case, it would still be true that the cognitive-epistemic, socio-psychological, 
financial and other kinds of obstacles to exit that were distinguished in section 3.3.1 can be 
expected to deny some members of illiberal minority cultures the ability to live a tolerable 
life outside their cultural community, and, consequently, a meaningful right of exit (for my 
argument for this claim, see section 3.3.2). Given that the liberty of these individuals cannot 
be discounted from a liberal perspective, what follows from this is that the objection that 
Kukathas’ strategy does not appropriately protect the individual freedom of dissident 
members of illiberal minority cultures still stands.    
3.3.4.2 Re-Rebuttal 2  
Let us turn to Kukathas’ second rebuttal. We saw previously that Kukathas believes that 
increasing people’s resources to exit will not bolster their ability to exit as, in his view, these 
additional resources will only weaken their motivation to leave their cultural community. 
From this, he concludes that the only way for the state to make people’s exit rights more 
“realistic” is to inculcate people with a desire or preference to exit. But, as he goes on to note, 
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this is unacceptable from a liberal point of view as it would interfere profoundly with 
people’s lives. 
   I believe that there are two problems with this rebuttal. First, Kukathas seems to assume 
that a reduction in people’s motivation to exit necessarily undermines their ability to leave 
their cultural community. I think this mistaken; it seems that a person’s motivation to do x 
can be reduced without affecting his ability to do x. For example, if I successfully persuade a 
friend to reduce his carbon footprint, this will make him more willing to e.g. drive a hybrid 
car, switch off the lights when he leaves the room, and eat local produce. Yet, it does not 
seem that by making my friend more environmentally conscious, I am reducing his ability to 
drive an SUV, leave the lights on when he is out of the room, and eat food from the other side 
of the world. Even if he is now less motivated to do these things, he seems as capable of 
doing them, ceteris paribus, as he was before I persuaded him to become more 
environmentally conscious. 
   Second, even if there was a logical relationship between people’s motivation and their 
ability to exit, it still does not seem that an increase in people’s resources to exit their cultural 
community will necessarily decrease their willingness to leave. Though this trade-off may 
occur, I want to argue that it need not. In order to do this, we should consider first how an 
increase in people’s resources to exit (which I construe broadly to include any material or 
non-material goods that may help an agent to overcome the different kinds of obstacles to 
exit that were identified in section 3.3.1) may weaken their motivation to exit. Seeing how 
people’s motivation to leave their cultural community is likely to be weakened if their 
resources to exit are increased in a particular way will allow us to understand later why the 
other way of increasing these resources is unlikely to reduce their motivation to exit. 
     Though Kukathas does not go into this, it seems that for there to be a trade-off between a 
person’s resources and motivation to exit, the increase in the person’s resources to exit must 
somehow increase his freedom within the cultural community. An example will best illustrate 
this. Suppose that the state decides to fund a series of lectures on the compatibility of gender 
equality and Islam in order to improve the position of women within conservative Muslim 
communities. Further suppose – somewhat optimistically - that these lectures have their 
intended effect, i.e. that they persuade the elites of these communities to grant more freedom 
to their female members. Finally suppose that these changes render it possible for at least 
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some women within these groups to take up a job or go to university without facing social 
disproval. As I understand it, this is a situation in which these women’s resources to exit are 
(indirectly) increased by the state’s decision to subsidise the series of lectures. For one thing, 
the money they earn with their new jobs can be expected to make them financially less 
dependent on members of their cultural community. Moreover, those women who use their 
new freedoms to pursue higher education are likely to be better able to overcome the 
cognitive-epistemic obstacles to exit that were identified (see section 3.3.1), the reason being 
that there is a greater chance that they will acquire the critical thinking skills and knowledge 
of alternative ways of life that are necessary to have a realistic ability to change cultural 
affiliations.  
   Whilst increasing these women’s resources to exit, it seems unlikely, however, that these 
new opportunities to work and study will also increase their motivation to leave their cultural 
community. Though this claim requires empirical corroboration, the fact that there are 
feminist movements within many Orthodox Muslim societies gives us reason to suspect that a 
fair proportion of these women would actually value these newly-gained freedoms. If I am 
right about this, then this suggests that these individuals would not become more inclined to 
exit their cultural community, but rather less inclined to do so. Furthermore, even if there are 
women in these groups who would not value these freedoms, it is difficult to see why they 
would oppose them, at least as long as their community is not forced to reform by outsiders.    
Inasmuch as this is true, it seems that that the state’s funding of the lectures on the 
compatibility of Islam and feminism (indirectly) increases these women’s resources to exit by 
making them better able to overcome financial and cognitive-epistemic obstacles to exit, yet 
without increasing their motivation to leave their cultural community.  
     Now, insofar as (i) state attempts to increase the resources to exit of members of illiberal 
minority cultures will only be effective if they (directly or indirectly) increase their freedom 
within the group, and if (ii) having more freedom within the group weakens people’s 
motivation to exit, then we can conclude that, if Kukathas is right that (iii) weakening 
people’s motivation to exit undermines their capacity to exit, then (iv) it is impossible for the 
state to make the exit rights of members of illiberal minority cultures more realistic unless, as 
Kukathas argued, it increases their motivation to leave their cultural community. However, as 
  
 
 
64 
it was previously noted, Kukathas seems right that this option is unacceptable from a liberal 
viewpoint as it would involve far-reaching interference with people’s private lives.   
    I have already challenged premise (iii) when I suggested that there is no logical 
relationship between a person’s motivation and capacity to exit. My aim here is to show that 
that those who disagree may still reject conclusion (iv) because premise (i) is problematic as 
well. Contrary to what Kukathas suggests, there seem to be ways to increase people’s 
resources to exit that do not weaken their motivation to leave their cultural community, at 
least not in any evident sense. Indeed, I suspect that most of the measures of this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy fall into this category. In section 4.2, we shall be 
looking at these measures in detail; for now, I want to discuss two of them in order to 
illustrate how the state may increase people’s resources to exit without reducing their 
motivation to leave their cultural community. 
    In order to secure substantive exit rights for the members of illiberal minority cultures, I 
will argue in section 4.2.1 that the state should ensure, amongst other things, that children 
receive an autonomy-facilitating education. The rationale behind this type of education is to 
enable people to deliberate about a cultural exit by inculcating them with the requisite critical 
thinking skills and knowledge of alternative cultural lifestyles. Important here is that whilst 
this type of education increases people’s resources to exit by allowing them to overcome 
what I termed ‘cognitive-epistemic obstacles to exit’ (see section 3.3.1), it does not in any 
evident sense increase their freedom within their cultural community. For example, it is 
anything but clear that equipping female members of patriarchal communities with various 
cognitive skills and knowledge of their cultural options will weaken the gender hierarchies of 
these groups. 
     Of course, it may be countered that by making an autonomy-facilitating education 
compulsory, this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy is likely to indirectly secure 
greater liberty for subordinated members of illiberal minority cultures. The thought is that the 
knowledge of alternative cultural lifestyles and critical thinking skills these subordinated 
individuals will acquire as part of this education makes it likely that they will (eventually) 
challenge their group’s illiberal aspects. 
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    Whilst we should not too hastily assume that subordinated members of illiberal minority 
cultures will use their capacity for personal autonomy to challenge their culture’s illiberal 
norms and practices – as I will suggest below, it is not uncommon for people to 
autonomously endorse circumscribed lives - some can be expected to do so. Even so, it is 
unclear whether this challenging will secure greater intra-group freedom for them. For one 
thing, there is the risk that the strategy’s autonomy-facilitating education will fuel reactive 
culturalism. This is most likely to occur when adult members of illiberal minority cultures 
fear that the cultural beliefs and values they are trying to transmit to younger generations are 
being subverted in schools; under these conditions, it seems a real possibility that cultural 
elites will not respond to internal calls for liberal reform by granting their subordinated 
members more liberty, but rather by restricting their freedom even more (see section 2.3.1). 
    Finally, we have no reason to assume either that the strategy’s autonomy-facilitating 
education will (generally) increase the intra-group freedom of subordinated members by 
making their exit rights more substantial. The idea here is a familiar one, namely that 
subordinated people can be expected to use the threat of exit as leverage to demand greater 
freedom within their cultural community, and to do so successfully. The problem with this 
view, as section 3.2.2 showed, is that we have no reason to suppose that guaranteeing 
members of illiberal minority cultures realistic exit options will always have this side-effect, 
or even in most cases.  
    If I am right about this, then it is doubtful whether the intra-group liberty of female 
members of patriarchal communities – and that of subordinated members of illiberal minority 
cultures in general – will be promoted by the strategy’s autonomy-facilitating education. 
Since it is unlikely that an increase in these women’s intra-group liberty would have 
weakened their motivation to stay with their cultural community (see above), it seems to 
follow that we have no reason to assume that this type of education will weaken their 
motivation to exit. Contra Kukathas, this then suggests that it may well be possible to 
increase people’s resources to exit without decreasing their motivation to leave their cultural 
community. 
     Idem ditto for the second measure of this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy. 
According to this measure, which is discussed at length in section 4.2.3, the state should 
compensate citizens financially if they are left destitute by a cultural exit. The rationale of 
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this kind of assistance is not to make them rich, but rather to ensure that they have the 
economic wherewithal to sustain themselves if they change cultural affiliations. This way, 
citizens should be enabled to overcome the financial obstacles to exit that were identified in 
section 3.3.1.  
    As with the first measure, there seems to be no reason to assume that this measure will 
make members of illiberal minority cultures less motivated to exit. If people were unable to 
maintain themselves financially should they leave their cultural community, it certainly 
would be strange if their motivation to exit was weakened by the availability of this kind of 
support. If I am right about this, then we have another example of a measure that increases 
people’s resources to exit without weakening their motivation to leave their cultural 
community. 
    I have argued that depending on whether a particular way of increasing people’s resources 
to exit promotes their freedom within their cultural community, their motivation to exit is 
likely or unlikely to be weakened. If this is correct, then we can conclude the following: even 
if people’s ability to exit is undermined if they become less motivated to exit (a claim on 
which I have already cast doubt), this dissertation’s substantive exit right strategy would not 
be an incoherent strategy as it seems to make people’s ability to exit more realistic without 
weakening their motivation of exit. Neither is it a morally objectionable strategy as it does 
not try to change people’s preferences in ways that will make them more motivated to leave 
their cultural community. Given that Kukathas’ objections to this approach are unpersuasive, 
then, it appears that liberals should prefer it to his strategy as it better protects the individual 
freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures (see section 3.3.2). 
     Before discussing a come-back that proponents of Kukathas’s strategy could make, let me 
address an issue that may have caught the reader’s attention in passing. I have suggested that 
there are two ways of making people’s exit rights more realistic – one that is likely to reduce 
their motivation to exit by increasing her freedom within their cultural community, and one 
that is not. The question that arises here is this: which way should liberals prefer? 
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Which way of Increasing Citizens’ Resources to Exit Should Liberals Prefer? 
At first sight, it seems that measures that foster a person’s ability to exit in a way that 
decreases her motivation to exit are preferable to those that foster this ability without 
reducing her motivation to leave her cultural community. The reason should be obvious: 
changing cultural affiliations is an unpleasant experience for most of us, even if it may be 
liberating for some.  
     But if this is the case, one is led to wonder: should we not spare people this fate whenever 
possible? More specifically, should this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy not 
require states to increase the resources of subordinated members of illiberal minority cultures 
in a way that decreases their motivation to exit, namely by increasing their intra-group 
liberty? 
    I think not. The problem with requiring states to increase the intra-group liberty of 
subordinated members of illiberal minority cultures is that it would effectively have to try to 
liberalise these groups. As a consequence of this, my favoured substantive exit rights strategy 
would inherit the objections that were raised to Kymlicka’s perfectionist liberal strategy; like 
the latter, it would (i) carry a high risk of reactive culturalism, and (ii) fail to give due 
protection to the individual freedom (understood in both the senses distinguished in this 
dissertation) of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures (see section 2.3). These 
objections would remain, it seems, even though the attempts to liberalise illiberal minority 
cultures would not be justified as a means of promoting their members’ personal autonomy 
(as with Kymlicka’s strategy), but rather as a means of securing meaningful exit rights for 
them. After all, the conservative members of these groups would still be hindered in their 
ability to live in accordance with their illiberal conceptions of the good. 
 
3.3.5 A Final Come-Back    
Let us return to the challenge that has been presented to Kukathas’ plain exit rights strategy. 
It was argued in section 3.3.2 that this strategy does not appropriately protect the freedom of 
conscience (or freedom 1) of dissident members of illiberal minority cultures, and that this 
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dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy is superior in this respect. My aim in this last 
subsection is to consider a final comeback that its proponents can make.  
     I suspect that proponents of Kukathas’ strategy will not so much deny that this 
dissertation’s  substantive exit rights strategy better accommodates the individual freedom of 
dissident members of illiberal minority cultures, but rather object that this is done at an 
unacceptable price. The price is that the range of illiberal cultural practices in which citizens 
can engage is substantially more restricted than on Kukathas’ account (recall that the only 
constraint Kukathas is willing to impose on the internal conduct of cultural communities is 
that they cannot force their members to remain with the group). As we will see in section 
4.2.2, my favoured substantive exit rights strategy imposes various restrictions on the internal 
conduct of illiberal minority cultures in order to secure meaningful exit rights for their 
members, as well as to protect their children from severe harm.  
     Now, proponents of Kukathas’ strategy may argue that the range of permissible illiberal 
cultural practices is being so much restricted by this approach that it fails to appropriately 
protect the individual freedom of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures. This 
critique is likely to focus on its educational requirements, more specifically on its 
requirement that children should follow an autonomy-facilitating education. The reason is 
that this particular requirement denies conservative members of illiberal minority cultures a 
liberty that many of them eagerly seek: the liberty to shield their youngest members from the 
outside world and to prevent them from acquiring the cognitive skills and knowledge that 
would enable them to critically examine the group’s tenets and practices. If this is correct, 
then the main objection to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy that proponents 
of Kukathas’ strategy are likely to raise is that its compulsory autonomy-facilitating 
education infringes on the individual freedom of conservative members of illiberal minority 
cultures who oppose this type of education. These members may include the parents of 
children that are educated for personal autonomy, but also other members of the cultural 
community.  
     In my view, this criticism remains unpersuasive. To say that that a compulsory autonomy-
facilitating education for children infringes on the individual freedom of (certain) parents or 
other members the cultural community presupposes that children are mere extensions of, or 
owned by, their parents and/or their cultural community. But this surely cannot be right; to 
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treat children as extensions/possessions of their parents or cultural community goes against 
the Kantian conception of people that lies at the heart of liberalism, namely that of separate 
moral agents who cannot merely be used as means for others’ goals.  
    If I am right about this, then we can conclude the following: even if some parents and other 
members of illiberal minority cultures are constrained in their ability to act on their illiberal 
conceptions of the good if ‘their’ children have to follow an autonomy-facilitating education 
against their wishes, it would be an exaggeration to call this an ‘infringement’ on their 
individual freedom. Furthermore, it seems that the imposition of these constraints is justified 
from a liberal perspective in order to protect children from far greater constraints on their 
liberty that they may face if they do not receive this kind of education. For it is difficult to 
deny that having one’s children educated for autonomy against one’s wishes is normally a 
less serious restriction on one’s individual freedom than being effectively condemned to 
remain with a cultural community of which one cannot in good conscience be part because 
one, lacking a minimum degree of personal autonomy, cannot overcome various cognitive-
epistemic obstacles to exit (think of the Amish women discussed in section 3.3.2).  
    In order to provide suitable protection for dissident members of illiberal minority cultures, 
then, we need a strategy that guarantees them meaningful exit rights. This means, amongst 
other things, that the children of these groups should receive an autonomy-facilitating 
education (below, I will discuss four additional measures that are necessary). This is because 
children may become dissident members as they grow up, that is, they may come to reject 
fundamental values, beliefs, and practices of their cultural community. Since Kukathas’ 
strategy does not propose any measures to make the exit rights of (future) dissident members 
of illiberal minority cultures more substantial, I conclude that liberals should favour this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy to his approach. 
 
  
 
 
70 
4. The Substantive Exit Rights Strategy 
 
The previous two chapters argued that Kymlicka’s and Kukathas’ strategies for dealing with 
illiberal cultural practices do not appropriately protect the individual freedom of particular 
groups of citizens. Whereas Kymlicka’s attempts to create a “fully liberal” society were 
shown to give conservative members of illiberal minority cultures insufficient room to act on 
their conceptions of the good, it became clear that Kukathas’ failure to provide dissident 
members of illiberal minority cultures with a realistic ability to exit means that their 
individual freedom is not appropriately protected. The purpose of this chapter is to outline a 
strategy for dealing with internally illiberal minority cultures that strikes a better (i.e. fairer) 
balance between the freedoms of conservative and dissident members of illiberal minority 
cultures: the substantive exit rights strategy. To do this, I will first specify the conditions 
under which this strategy tolerates illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures. Next, I will 
discuss the measures of this strategy that ought to realise these conditions.  
4.1 Conditions 
As it may be recalled, this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy prescribes that the 
state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own 
members if and only if two conditions are met:  
  
(i) Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to 
change cultural affiliations. 
(ii) The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe 
harm on children. 
 
Whilst these conditions have already briefly been discussed in section 1.1, it is necessary to 
look at them more closely in this chapter.  
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4.1.1 Condition I 
Let us start with condition (i). A person has a substantive or meaningful right of exit on my 
account if and only if she can, and knows that she can, live a decent life in another cultural 
community within her society. In the case of illiberal minority cultures, this ‘other cultural 
community’ has to be the liberal majority culture for reasons I will discuss below. 
    To have a realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture in one’s society, it is 
considered to be both necessary and sufficient that one can overcome the five kinds of 
obstacles to exit that were distinguished in section 3.3.1. In my view, this is the case when six 
requirements are met. According to the first two requirements, a person (a) is not forcefully 
prevented from leaving her cultural community, and (b) the liberal majority culture is willing 
to accept her as a member. These requirements constitute the bare essentials of her right of 
exit. By contrast, the other four requirements render this right ‘substantive’ or ‘meaningful’.  
    The first of the remaining requirements is that the person in question (c) has the economic 
wherewithal to maintain herself outside her cultural community. The second is that she (d) 
has access to what Sigal Ben-Porath (2010) terms “entrance paths”, that is, to forms of 
assistance and services that will help her integrate into another cultural community (one 
might think of language classes and support groups of ex-members). The third requirement is 
that she (e) has a minimum degree of personal autonomy that enables her to deliberate about 
a cultural exit. The final requirement is that she (f) is free from exposure to (cultural) 
practices that make it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, for her to enjoy a 
substantive or meaningful right of exit. ‘Extremely difficult’ here means that even if all the 
other requirements are met, these practices are still likely to deny her a realistic ability to 
change cultural affiliations. 
     The measures that should meet requirements a to f will be discussed in section 4.2. For 
now, it is important to ask why it is crucial from a liberal perspective for members of illiberal 
minority cultures to have a realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture. 
    The answer, it should be underscored, is not that this will make it more likely that they will 
join the liberal majority culture. Unlike Kymlicka’s strategy, the aim of this dissertation’s 
substantive exit rights strategy is not to create a “fully liberal society”, that is, a society in 
which citizens are liberal in both the political sphere and private sphere. Rather, the reason 
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this strategy aims to guarantee members of illiberal minority cultures a realistic ability to join 
the liberal majority culture is, first, to protect the individual freedom (understood in both the 
senses distinguished in this dissertation) of dissident subgroups. To be able to act on their 
(more) progressive beliefs about the good, we saw in section 3.3 that dissident members of 
illiberal minority cultures require access to a (broadly) liberal cultural community. 
    The second, and more controversial, reason why it is important that (dissident and non-
dissident) members of illiberal minority cultures have a realistic ability to join the liberal 
majority culture is that they should be able to take advantage of their full range of basic rights 
and liberties. As it was noted in section 3.3.2.1, this is not possible in internally illiberal 
cultural communities as, by definition, these groups impose social constraints on the exercise 
of their members’ fundamental freedoms. For example, within strongly patriarchal 
communities such as those of the Salafists and Ultra-Orthodox Jews, a woman is likely to 
face disapproval and retaliation if she claims the freedom to work, study, start a relationship 
with a person of the same sex, et cetera. Yet, even members with a higher standing (e.g. male 
members) may be substantially restricted in their ability to exercise basic rights and liberties.  
    I believe that having a realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture in which one can 
exercise one’s basic rights and liberties is important from a liberal perspective independently 
of whether members of illiberal minority cultures value this ability, or want to make use of it. 
Many liberals would be troubled, and quite rightly I want to suggest, if citizens of a liberal 
society were unable to take advantage of their full range of basic rights and liberties due to 
cultural constraints; whenever this is the case, it seems that not enough is done to ensure that 
citizens are effectively free rather than merely formally free. Whilst this does not allow liberal 
states to shape illiberal minority cultures in their ideological image as this, I argued in section 
2.3.2, would impose excessive constraints on the ability of conservative citizens to act on 
their illiberal conceptions of the good, it does require that they take measures to secure 
substantive exit rights for both conservative and dissident members of illiberal minority 
cultures. 
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4.1.2 Condition II 
Condition (ii) maintains that the state should remedy illiberal practices of cultural 
communities that severely harm children (in a psychological and/or physical sense).
26
 In my 
view, adding this condition to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy renders it 
more plausible. Unlike condition (i), however, it is not central to it. This means, inter alia, 
that liberals may accept this approach without accepting the claim that the state should 
protect children from severely harmful cultural practices.  
    In order to see why condition (ii) is not central to my favoured substantive exit rights 
strategy, recall that the rationale of this strategy is to meet liberalism’s core requirement: the 
protection of individual freedom (see section 1.1). However, if the state’s pre-emptive 
objective from a liberal perspective is to protect people’s individual freedom, then it is 
unclear why it should remedy cultural practices that inflict severe harm on children. Whilst 
children may not be able to escape these practices as their dependency on adults denies them 
meaningful exit rights, the same applies to many non-harmful cultural practices that most 
liberals seem unwilling to remedy – one might think of bringing one’s children to church, 
celebrating their Bar Mitzvahs, taking them to football matches, et cetera. This fact, I believe, 
renders it dubious whether freedom considerations alone can justify (ii), which is why this 
condition is not seen as central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy. 
     Whilst not central to it, it seems that including condition (ii) makes this strategy more 
plausible. Many people (liberal and non-liberals) would agree, and quite rightly I want to 
suggest, that one’s physical and psychological integrity is of such importance that no human 
being should be exposed to severely harmful cultural practices without having a realistic 
means of avoiding such exposure. Since children normally lack a realistic ability to exit their 
cultural community, and thus a realistic ability to escape its severely harmful practices, it 
seems important that the state protects them from these kinds of practices (why children 
should not be protected from modestly harmful cultural practices, and why adults should be 
free to engage in cultural practices that (severely) harm them will be discussed in section 
4.2.2).  
                                                 
26
 The same applies to mentally challenged adults. Rather than discussing them as a separate category, what I 
will say about children in this subsection is supposed to hold true of them as well. 
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4.2 Measures  
 
We saw that the central aim of this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy is to secure 
substantive exit rights for (adult) members of illiberal minority cultures, and that these rights 
ought to guarantee them a realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture. In order to do 
this, I noted that six requirements have to be met. My next aim is to discuss five measures 
that should meet those requirements.  
     Before looking at the five measures, it is important to warn against two possible 
misunderstandings of their rationale. First, it should be noted that the measures of this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy are not meant to stimulate members of illiberal 
minority cultures to leave their cultural community. Whilst more of their members can be 
expected to exit if they have a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations than if they did 
not, this is not something that this strategy aims for. In other words, changing cultural 
affiliations is not considered to be intrinsically valuable by its proponents, nor is it seen as 
desirable as such when citizens leave their illiberal cultural community for a (more) liberal 
cultural community. What matters instead is that members of illiberal minority cultures who 
wish to change cultural affiliations in order to escape illiberal cultural practices are not 
prevented from doing so because they lack a meaningful right of exit. 
    Second, it should be noted that the five measures of this dissertation’s substantive exit 
rights strategy are not intended to make a cultural exit easy, and need not do so. By reducing 
the impact of the five kinds of obstacles to exit distinguished in section 3.3.1, these measures 
will make it easier for many members of illiberal minority cultures to change cultural 
affiliations – this is undoubtedly true. Still, this does not necessarily mean that it will become 
easy for these individuals to leave their cultural community. Even for those with substantive 
exit rights, exiting may be very difficult. According to this strategy, this is acceptable as long 
as members of illiberal minority cultures have a realistic ability to join the liberal majority 
culture.  
    Now, some may hold that as long as people experience these difficulties, they do not enjoy 
a substantive or meaningful right of exit. Inasmuch as my favoured substantive exit rights 
strategy fails to make it easy for people to change cultural affiliations, this would then 
suggest that it fails to realise its aim. 
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     I think this view is problematic. It seems sensible to say that as long as people are able, 
and knows that they are able, to live a decent life outside their cultural community, they have 
a realistic ability to exit their cultural community – even if they find it difficult to do so. Just 
as having a realistic ability to do x, as we saw in section 3.3.2.2, does not seem to require that 
one be motivated to do x, it seems that having a realistic ability to do x does not require that 
one finds it easy to do x. For example, it may not be easy for a Dutchman to pay for my 
dinner, but if he has a decent salary and enough money in his wallet to pay the bill, he surely 
has a realistic ability to do so. The same applies, I believe, to a person who finds it difficult to 
leave her cultural community, yet who is able, and knows that she is able, to live a decent life 
outside the group.  
    Having warned against these possible misunderstandings regarding the rationale of the 
strategy’s measures, let us now look at these measures in detail. 
 
4.2.1 Autonomy-Facilitating Education 
The first measure that the state should take in order to secure substantive exit rights for 
members of illiberal minority cultures is to ensure that its citizenry receives an autonomy-
facilitating education. The reason why it is important to educate citizens for personal 
autonomy is that this will enable them to overcome the cognitive-epistemic obstacles to exit 
that were identified in section 3.3.1. Before looking at the requirements of this type of 
education, it should be noted that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy only 
demands that children be compulsorily educated for personal autonomy; though adult citizens 
are free to follow an autonomy-facilitating education if they wish, they should not be required 
to do so. 
    There are at least two reasons why an autonomy-facilitating education should not be made 
compulsory for adults. First, (re-)educating adults may often be ineffective or inefficient, as 
their ability and motivation to absorb new knowledge and develop new skills seems generally 
low. Second and more importantly, there are moral problems with forcing adults (back) into 
the classroom. It is commonly held, and I want to suggest quite rightly, that adults’ status as 
moral and rational agents gives them an integrity that is violated if the state (re-)educates 
them without their consent. Notice that this does not apply to children, or at least not to the 
same extent; most children, especially when they are young, do not have the capacity for 
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rational and moral agency that adults generally possess, which is why it seems legitimate to 
act paternalistically towards them in various ways that would be unacceptable in the case of 
adults.  
   Since the autonomy-facilitating education of this dissertation’s substantive exit rights 
strategy imposes the most far-reaching constraints on the power of cultural communities over 
their members, it is important to consider what its requirements are. This will be our next 
aim.  
4.2.1.1 Cognitive Skills and Cultural Knowledge 
To ensure that children acquire the capacity for a minimum degree of personal autonomy that 
is necessary for substantive exit rights, schools should equip them with various cognitive 
skills These include an ability to absorb and retain information, a capacity for critical thought, 
certain basic logic and reasoning skills, et cetera. Without these skills, it is difficult to see 
how a person could deliberate about changing cultural affiliations, and thusly how she could 
gain a realistic ability to leave her cultural community.  
     Another requirement is that schools teach children about alternative cultural ways of 
living. There are two reasons why knowledge of how other cultural communities live is a 
prerequisite of substantive exit rights. First, having this kind of knowledge allows for the 
creation of reflective distance between oneself and one’s cultural ends, which is necessary to 
render living in a different cultural environment a conceivable option (cf. Okin, 2002, p.222). 
The thought is that unless people are capable of seeing their cultural lifestyle from a more 
objective or detached point of view, exiting their cultural community will often be 
inconceivable to them as their sense of self is likely to be constituted by the ends of their 
cultural community. Needless to say, those in this situation will not have a realistic ability to 
exit.  
     The second reason why knowledge of alternative cultural lifestyles is a prerequisite of 
substantive exit rights is that people need to know what their cultural options are, i.e. they 
must be informed about the cultural communities they may wish to join should they decide to 
leave their current community. Without this knowledge, their ability to exit is likely to be 
impaired by fears of a future in an unknown cultural milieu and/or by negative 
misconceptions that they may hold about other cultural communities (see section 3.3.1). 
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4.2.1.2 Multicultural Curriculum 
To acquire the capacity for personal autonomy that is necessary for substantive exit rights, I 
argued above that children should be taught about different cultural lifestyles. What has not 
yet been discussed is how we decide which cultural communities are to be included in the 
educational curriculum.  
    Given that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy aims to guarantee members of 
illiberal minority cultures a realistic ability to join the liberal majority culture (see section 
4.1), it is clear that the liberal majority culture must be part of the curriculum. This means 
that children from illiberal cultural backgrounds ought to be taught how the values of 
individual freedom and equality are expressed in (some of) the norms and practices that 
govern this group.  
   At the same time, it is important that illiberal minority cultures be included in the 
curriculum as well. The reason for this is twofold. First, it helps to protect the individual 
freedom (in both the senses distinguished in this dissertation) of the members of the liberal 
majority culture. In order to see this, notice that these individuals may come to feel alienated 
from their culture’ s progressive lifestyle – possibly because they believe that it propagates a 
“licentious  freedom” as Lester (2006, p.622) puts it – and develop a desire to join an illiberal 
minority culture. To do so, however, it is essential that they have a minimum amount of 
knowledge of these groups, which will only be possible if illiberal minority cultures are 
included in educational curricula.
27
 
    This is not to say that all illiberal minority cultures merit inclusion; since one of the 
primary responsibilities of the state is to ensure that different cultural communities can co-
exist peacefully, children should not be acquainted with the beliefs and practices of Taliban-
like communities. Thus, the inclusion of illiberal minority cultures in the curriculum is 
always subject to the requirement that they are peaceful. Since this dissertation’s substantive 
exit rights strategy is premised on a political liberal account of liberalism, we may even go 
                                                 
27
 Though children of the liberal majority culture may be taught about the lifestyles of illiberal minority cultures 
at home, these cases seem rare. In addition to this, the information they would receive within their homes is 
likely to be biased. 
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further and require that they also be “reasonable” in Rawls’ sense, that is, that they respect 
the free and equal status of citizens when fundamental political matters are decided (Rawls, 
2005, p.12). 
    The second reason for including (reasonable) illiberal minority cultures in the curriculum is 
a matter of justice. Due to its political liberal commitments, this dissertation’s substantive 
exit rights strategy cannot allow the state to be biased towards any particular reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine in its policies. This requires, however, that children do not just learn 
about the lifestyles of the liberal majority culture, but also about those of (reasonable) 
illiberal minority cultures. If this requirement is not met, then members of illiberal minority 
cultures may rightly object that this type of education is trying to lure their members away.  
     This brings us to the content of the multicultural curriculum. According to the substantive 
exit rights strategy, it is imperative that schools provide children with descriptive information 
about various cultures. Whilst violent and/or unreasonable cultures may be portrayed as 
inferior or, alternatively, be left out of the curriculum altogether, schools should not teach 
children that some reasonable cultures are better than others. Neither should they, as strongly 
illiberal groups in particular may fear, ask them to evaluate reasonable cultural or religious 
beliefs and values from a scientific or normative point of view.  
    Finally, the time and place to teach citizens about different cultural lifestyles is during 
secondary school when children’s ability to learn about different cultures is at its height 
(Lester, 2006; MacMullen, 2007). Emile Lester has proposed that children be taught about 
different cultural and religious communities during their sophomore or junior year. To do this 
earlier, he warns, may lead to “a chaotic sense of self that cannot be reversed or a dramatic 
blow to the student’s self-esteem” (Lester, 2006, p.626). At the same time, he notes that it 
should not take place at a later as, by that time, “the community’s indoctrination of the 
student is so complete that they preclude any sense of distance” (Lester, 2006, p.627).  
    Whether Lester is right about this is something I leave open here. My aim here was not to 
discuss during what period of childhood citizens ought to be exposed to different cultural 
lifestyles – this is a task for pedagogical experts. Rather, the aim has been to explain why a 
multicultural curriculum is a necessary component of this dissertation’s substantive exit 
rights strategy, and to outline some requirements that this curriculum has to meet. 
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4.2.1.2 Is a Multicultural Curriculum Necessary? 
In opposition to what has been argued above, not all theorists believe that securing 
substantive exit rights for members of illiberal minority cultures calls for the implementation 
of a multicultural curriculum. For example, Jeff Spinner-Halev contends that it is otiose for 
schools to teach children about different cultural lifestyles, even for children of close-knit 
communities such as those of the Hutterites, Amish, and Hasidic Jews (Spinner-Halev, 2000, 
p.49; 2005, p.163). In his view, the members of these groups are already sufficiently aware of 
the existence of alternative lifestyles to have a meaningful exit option. He thus notes that   
“Most Hutterites, the Amish and Hasidic Jews all know that they are surrounded by a society 
with different ways of life. […] Many Hasidic Jews live and work in New York City. How 
can one possibly argue that they do not see a wide range of options of how they might want to 
live their lives? The Hasidic children in Alaska may be given a narrow education, but they 
certainly are aware that there are different ways to live. Even Hasidic Jews in Jerusalem are 
aware that there are other ways of life” (Spinner-Halev, 2005, pp.49-50).  
Spinner-Halev seems right to point out that most members of the Hutterite, Amish and 
Hasidic Jewish communities are aware of the existence of different ways of life within their 
society. Yet, even if this is so, it does not follow that a multicultural curriculum is not 
necessary to guarantee them meaningful exit rights. What Spinner-Halev is insufficiently 
attentive to is that there is a difference between knowing that there are cultural communities 
with different lifestyles in one’s society, and having enough knowledge of these lifestyles to 
possess a realistic ability to exit; it seems that simply knowing that there are cultures who do 
things differently will normally not be sufficient for having this ability, especially when 
people hold negative misconceptions about many of these cultures.       
     The claim that a multicultural curriculum is necessary in order to secure substantive ext 
rights for members of illiberal minority cultures is supported by Stevie Mazie’s (2005) study 
of the Amish practice of Rumspringa. During Rumspsringa (literally: jumping around), 
Amish adolescents are allowed to experience life outside the Amish community and many of 
them also choose to live outside the group. After this period – which may last for years – they 
then decide whether or not they want to be baptised, and by doing so, become a member of 
the Amish church. 
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     Despite this unique opportunity to explore the wider society (most strongly illiberal 
communities, it should be noted, try to shield their members from outside influences and 
certainly would not allow their members to submerge themselves into the mainstream 
culture), around 90 percent of the Amish joins the church (Mazie, 2005, p.752). According to 
Mazie, an important cause of these high return-rates is that whilst the Amish spend much 
time outside their community, they do not get an accurate impression of what life in wider 
society is really about. Most of them, he writes, spends their Rumspringa living a Bacchanal 
life whereby binge-drinking and the consumption of drugs are anything but uncommon 
(Mazie, 2005, pp.750-2). If this is correct, then the fact that the “lowest common denominator 
of crude American culture presents itself as the alternative to Amish life” as Mazie puts it 
leaves it no surprise that the far majority of Amish adolescents chooses for the simple, pious 
existence of the Amish community (Mazie, 2005, p.752).  
   The point of this example is that although the Amish know that they are “surrounded by 
different ways of life” and even live outside the Amish community during a period, this does 
not seem enough for many of them to overcome the cognitive-epistemic obstacles that were 
identified (see section 3.31). Not only do they not learn about the finer aspects of the 
mainstream culture such as art and literature, they also get a false – or at least not 
representative - impression of what life outside the Amish community is really about; after 
all, few members of the mainstream culture live as wildly as many Amish youngsters do 
during their Rumspringa.  
     If this is so, then contra Spinner-Halev, the mere knowledge that one is surrounded by 
cultures with different lifestyles does not seem enough information to have a realistic ability 
to change cultural affiliations. Instead, what people need is knowledge of how other cultural 
communities live. Since it is unlikely that members of illiberal minority cultures will acquire 
this knowledge within their cultural communities (as noted previously, many of these groups 
try to shield their members from outside influences), it seems necessary that schools teach 
children about different cultural lifestyles in order to secure substantive exit rights for them.    
4.2.1.3 What should be the Minimum Level of Autonomy for which Citizens are Educated? 
Having considered why this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy advocates a 
compulsory autonomy-facilitating education and what requirements this education ought to 
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meet, I want to ask what the minimal level of autonomy is for which people should be 
educated in order to acquire meaningful exit rights. 
    According to Ben Spieker, Doret de Ruyter and Jan Steutel (2006, p.320), they should at 
least be educated to stage four of Lawrence Kohlberg’s scale of moral development (cf. 
Kohlberg, 1971). At this stage, people are thought to have the capacity for a minimum degree 
of personal autonomy, which means that they can follow rules because they deem them good 
or right rather than to simply meet social expectations as people in stage 3 do. Though 
Spieker, De Ruyter, and Steutel do not go into this, the assumption here seems that since the 
behaviour of people in stage 3 is predominantly aimed at pleasing others, it will be very 
difficult for them to leave their cultural community. This is because a voluntary exit involves 
a breach of social expectations that can be expected to spark disapproval from other 
members. If true, it seems that people in stage 3 are likely to lack the capacity for 
independent agency that is necessary to have a realistic ability to exit. 
     Despite being able to follow rules because they deem them valid, Spieker, De Ruyter and 
Steutel go on to note that people in stage 4 will not be able to rationally justify these rules 
(Spieker, De Ruyter and Steutel (2006, p.320). This capacity is believed to involve a higher 
level of theoretical and practical reasoning that is characteristic of stage 5 and above on 
Kolberg’s scale.  
     Without wishing to commit myself to Kolhberg’s theory of moral development, which has 
been subject to much criticism, I believe that Spieker, De Ruyter, and Steutel are right to 
suggest that the skills and competencies belonging to stage 4 of his scale are a prerequisite of 
substantive exit rights. Whilst it is unlikely that people should be able and willing to critically 
examine their ends on a regular basis in order to have a realistic ability to exit – which would 
be a feature of stage 5 and above - it seems essential that their conduct is not (predominantly) 
determined by a desire to meet social expectations.  
     Finally, I want to explain why the state should not require schools to educate children for 
stage 5 or above, even if this would make them better prepared to overcome the cognitive-
epistemic obstacles to exit as identified in section 3.3.1. The reason is that such an education 
is likely to destabilise illiberal minority cultures that are ill-disposed towards individual self-
direction, and by doing so, render it difficult for their members to reap various benefits of 
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their cultural membership. In order to see this, notice that a cultural community normally 
perpetuates itself by ensuring that the children of current members come to share its way of 
life; whilst it may attract members from outside the community, these individuals usually 
form a minority of all its new members (Archard, 2003, p.142). This is a pertinent fact as it 
suggests that by educating children of strongly illiberal minority cultures for a high degree of 
personal autonomy, the inter-generational transmission of these groups’ values, beliefs, and 
practices is likely to be hindered. For example, children of certain religious groups may 
become too independent and critical to be able to show the “strong obedience to sacred texts 
and clerics’ pronouncements” of older generations, and to inherit the latter’s “deep, pervasive 
relationship to the […] community” (Lester, 2006, p.620). If this is so, then requiring schools 
to teach children for a high degree of personal autonomy can reasonably be expected to have 
a destabilising impact on cultural communities that that are hostile to individual self-
direction. 
    As noted above, the problem with this is that it will become difficult for their members to 
reap various benefits of their cultural membership that (to varying degrees) depend on the 
group’s stability. One might think of how cultural communities can provide their members 
with a feeling of solidarity, or with the safety of what Margalit and Raz call an “effortless 
belonging” (i.e. the reassuring idea that one’s membership of the group does not depend on 
personal merits), or as Kymlicka argues, with a framework of meaningful choice in which 
people can exercise their personal autonomy (Marglit & Raz, 1990, pp.446-7; Kymlicka, 
1995, pp.82-9). What this suggests, then, is that whilst the protection of the individual 
freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures (especially of dissident members) requires 
that they receive an autonomy-facilitating education (see section 3.3.2), the protection of 
these benefits demands that children not be compulsorily educated for a higher degree of 
personal autonomy than is necessary to guarantee them meaningful exit rights. 
 
4.2.2 Restrictions on Cultural Practices 
The second measure that the state should take in order to secure substantive exit rights for 
members of illiberal minority cultures is to remedy cultural practices that make it extremely 
difficult, if not practically impossible, for them to enjoy a realistic ability to leave their 
cultural community. ‘Extremely difficult’ here means that even if the other four measures for 
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securing substantive exit rights are taken
28
, these practices are still likely to deny (some) adult 
members a meaningful exit option.  
    The most obvious examples can be found in cultural practices that forcefully prevent 
people from leaving their cultural community. This is what happened to David Thomas, a 
member of the Coast Salish community in British Columbia; despite the fact that Thomas did 
not want to be a member of this community and had always lived off the reservation, he was 
kidnapped by its members who did not recognise his right of exit. After being brought to a 
long-house, Thomas was beaten and later sued his captivators for battery and false 
imprisonment (see Thomas vs. Norris [1992]). 
      Needless to say, if the state is to guarantee substantive exit rights to members of illiberal 
minority cultures, then it cannot allow cultural communities to force their members to 
remain. Neither can it tolerate violent threats against defectors. As Jacob Levy (2005, p.182) 
points out, these threats are not uncommon; within orthodox Islamic circles, for instance,  
fatwas or legal decrees have been issued to kill defectors from particular Muslim 
communities. 
     Yet, even if cultural practices that are not intended to deny people a realistic ability to 
leave their cultural community, they may still require state interference according to this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy. An example of such a practice can be found in 
the aforementioned ancient Chinese tradition of foot-binding. If this practice had persisted to 
date, then states would have to remedy it. The reason is that, although the binding of 
women’s feet may not be intended to deny people a meaningful right of exit (e.g. its only 
purpose may be aesthetic), the fact that women with bound feet are effectively left 
housebound means that it is unlikely that they will be able to function outside their cultural 
community. 
     Notice that the custom of foot-binding can be restricted on another count, namely that it 
that it inflicts severe harm (physical as well as psychological) on children.
29
 Whilst not 
central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, it was noted in section 4.1.2 that 
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 In addition to making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsory, these measures include: providing 
citizens who are left destitute by a cultural exit with financial assistance; offering defectors services to foster 
their integration into another cultural community; and making sure that the liberal majority culture is willing to 
admit members of all cultural and religious backgrounds. I will discuss the last three measures in sections 4.2.3-
4.2.5. 
29
 It is during childhood that women’s toes are broken and bound in order to keep their feet small. 
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remedying cultural practices that severely harm children is an important goal of public policy, 
and that this dissertation therefore supports a ban on these practices.
30
    
 
4.2.2.1 Tolerable Harm 
At this point, some liberals may hold that this dissertation’s substantive exit right strategy is 
still too tolerant of harmful cultural practices. More specifically, they may argue that the state 
should not just interfere with cultural practices that severely harm children, but also with 
those that severely harm adults and/or inflict modest harm on children, regardless of whether 
they make it difficult for the state to secure substantive exit rights. In what follows, my aim is 
to contest this view by explaining why it is important from a liberal perspective that the latter 
two kinds of practices be tolerated. 
  
Adults and Severely Harmful Cultural Practices 
Let us start by looking at cultural practices that severely harm adults. The reason why this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy is willing – within the previously specified 
limits - to tolerate these practices is not so much that their remediation would make adults 
worse-off. Whilst this may often be the case (for changes in an adult’s life to contribute to her 
well-being, it is commonly held that she should endorse these changes, which is unlikely if 
she is forced or pressured into them; cf. Brighthouse, 2002, pp.38-9), there is a more 
fundamental reason: to remedy cultural practices that severely harm adults imposes excessive 
constraints on the individual freedom (understood in both the senses distinguished in this 
dissertation) of those adults who support them. The assumption here is that if liberalism is 
truly committed to ensuring that people can live self-directed lives, then its adherents should 
accept that people may use this liberty in ways that will harm them, for example by 
undergoing FGM or conducting ritual scarring of their bodies. As long as they do not engage 
in practices that (i) are overly detrimental to their own or other’s capacity to exit and/or in 
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 In my view, the appropriate kind of remediation should depend on two criteria: the severity of the harm and 
the efficiency of the available measures. The more severe the harm is, the more reason there is for direct, 
coercive interference in order to end the harmful cultural practice as quickly as possible. However, insofar as 
there are indirect measures that remedy the harm more efficiently on the long-term such as persuasion and/or the 
provision of financial incentives then, ceteris paribus, these may have priority over more militant measures 
(how trade-offs between these two criteria ought to be made, I believe, should depend on the context). 
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practices that (ii) severely harm children (see above), this dissertation’s substantive exit rights 
strategy accordingly tolerates cultural practices that are severely harmful to adults.
31
   
    In response, a critic may note that many adults who are exposed to severely harmful 
practices do not endorse these practices. Rather, they put up with them because they deem an 
exit from their cultural community too costly, or because they have adapted their preferences. 
(Another reason why they may put up with cultural practices that severely harm them is that 
they have been brainwashed or indoctrinated; however, this scenario seems less relevant in 
this context as the autonomy-facilitating education of my favoured substantive exit rights 
strategy offers an important safeguard against these forms of manipulation). To protect the 
individual freedom of these individuals, she may thus argue that the state should remedy 
practices of cultural communities that severely harm their adult members. 
    The problem with this view is that the remediation of these practices may impose heavy 
constraints on the individual freedom (in both senses distinguished in this dissertation) of 
those adults who do endorse them. This holds especially true when their observance 
constitutes a core component of their conception of the good; for example, Parekh notes that 
for some adult women, undergoing FGM may be a way of “reminding themselves that they 
are from now onward primarily mothers rather than wives” or a “religious sacrifice of what 
they greatly value for the sake of their children and family” (Parekh, 1999, p.71). In order to 
respect the individual freedom of these individuals, it seems essential that the state tolerates 
cultural practices that severely harm adults, provided that their substantive exit rights are 
secured so that those adults who oppose these practices have a realistic opportunity to avoid 
them. Indeed, I suspect that the failure to do so would favour the interests of the opponents of 
these practices over those of their proponents, which is problematic if the state is to give 
equal consideration to citizens’ interests as liberalism demands.  
 
Children and Modestly Harmful Cultural Practices 
This brings me to the second category of harmful cultural practices that are tolerated by this 
dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy: those that inflict modest harm on children. 
What makes these practices controversial is that children are generally unable to avoid 
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 Notice that this does not necessarily mean that society should be required to bear the burden of these 
practices; for example, if I cut off my leg as part of some religious ritual, then it may be unjust to force other 
citizens to pay for my hospitalisation. Whether or not this is the case is something I leave open here.    
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exposure to them as they lack the ability to exit their cultural community, thereby rendering 
them considerably more vulnerable than most adults.  
    Despite this vulnerability, I believe that there are three jointly sufficient reasons why the 
state should tolerate cultural practices that are modestly harmful to children, provided that 
this is not overly detrimental to their future capacity to change cultural affiliations. First, 
many cultural practices that cause them (modest) harm also bring them benefits that cannot, 
or only with great difficulty, be achieved in their absence. For the state to interfere with these 
practices would consequently mean that children will not enjoy the benefits in question, or 
that they are unlikely to do so. For example, by not giving their children time off from their 
studies and piano rehearsal, Asian ‘tiger parents’ may deny them the goods of social activity 
and physical exercise. At the same time, it is plain that the solitary, Spartan regime to which 
these children are subjected has a beneficial impact on their academic accomplishments and 
musical skills, as well as that these benefits are unlikely to be gained without this harmful 
practice (‘no pain no gain’).   
     In response, it may be argued that the state should not remedy all cultural practices that 
are harmful in some respect, but only those that harm children overall. This is the case when 
the possible good that cultural practices do is outweighed by the harms they cause minus the 
possible harm that is caused by the state’s interference with them. 
     The problem with this view, and this brings me to the second reason why the state should 
tolerate cultural practices that modestly harm children if this is not overly detrimental to their 
future ability to exit, is that it is often difficult to determine whether cultural practices harm 
people overall, or even whether they harm them in some specific respect. Regarding the 
former, it remains unclear how we (or rather: the state) are going to weigh the benefits and 
harms of a given cultural practice against each other – indeed, one might even wonder 
whether there is a common unit of measurement to do so. Yet, difficulty would already be 
encountered at an earlier stage, namely that of determining of whether a given cultural 
practice harms a person in a specific respect. Inasmuch as (some) harms are culturally 
relative, or relative to the person exposed to them, it seems that this will often be unclear; for 
example, one might wonder whether the wearing of the burqa may be harmful in some 
cultural settings, but no in others and/or harmful to some women but not to others. To shed 
light on these questions, one would have to investigate whether practices that appear harmful 
to us really are harmful within the cultural community in which they occur and/or to the 
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particular person that is exposed to them. There is good reason to doubt whether states (or 
any other agents for that matter) are up to this task.  
    Of course, it might be held that the state should interfere with practices whenever it is 
unclear whether children are being harmed. This view, however, does not seem attractive 
either. The reason, and this brings me to the third and final reason why the state should 
tolerate cultural practices that are modestly harmful to children as long as their future exit 
rights are secure, is that such interference is likely to have a destabilising impact on cultural 
communities. The problem with this is that it is likely to render it difficult for their members 
to reap the benefits of cultural membership that depend on the stability of these groups (see 
section 4.2.1.3).  
 
4.2.3 Financial Assistance 
The third measure the state should take in order to secure substantive exit rights for members 
of illiberal minority cultures is to offer financial assistance to those citizens who are left 
destitute by their cultural exit (one might think of the Hutterites who even have to return their 
clothes to the community upon departure; see section 3.3.2.2). The rationale of this measure 
is to ensure that these individuals have the economic wherewithal to maintain themselves 
outside their cultural community. In what follows, I want to explain why the state should 
restrict this form of support to citizens who are left destitute by their cultural exit, and why it 
should only pay for their subsistence. 
Restrictions on the Financial Assistance  
It seems fairly uncontroversial (or at least I assume it to be) that if the state is to secure 
substantive exit rights for citizens, it should offer them financial assistance if an exit from 
their cultural community leaves them destitute. What is not so evident, by contrast, is why 
this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy maintains that the state should restrict this 
support to citizens who are left destitute by a cultural exit, and why these individuals should 
not receive more than people need in average to sustain themselves financially. It is therefore 
important to consider the rationale behind these restrictions. 
    In my view, the problem with widening the scope of defectors who are eligible for 
financial assistance and/or with giving them more money than they need to cover their 
subsistence is that it may render it difficult for members of economically marginalised 
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minority cultures to reap various benefits of their cultural membership. This is because more 
generous packages of support risk destabilising their cultural communities. The assumption 
here is that the better the financial prospects are for members of these groups, the more likely 
it is that they will leave. Whilst this assumption obviously stands in need of empirical 
corroboration, the fact that it is not uncommon for members of economically deprived 
cultural communities to join the majority culture in order to improve their financial situation 
(climbing the socio-economic ladder, it should be noted, may often be easier if they 
assimilate into the majority culture) suggests that it holds true in many cases.  
     Inasmuch as this is correct, it seems that even if providing more defectors with financial 
assistance and/or providing them with more generous packages of financial assistance does 
not generate a mass exodus from economically marginalised minority cultures, the fact that 
their members may become more motivated to change cultural affiliations may already have 
a destabilising impact on (some of) these cultural communities. If true, this would mean that 
it will become (more) difficult for their members to reap various benefits of their cultural 
membership that depend on the stability of these groups (e.g. a feeling of solidarity, common-
spiritedness, the availability of a meaningful framework of choice; see section 4.2.1.3). For 
example, it does not seem salutary for the feeling of solidarity and common-spiritedness 
within a cultural community if the prospect of financial gain brings their members (closer) to 
the brink of exiting.  
     To avoid gratuitously destabilising cultural communities, then, this dissertation’s 
substantive exit rights strategy prescribes that the state should not offer financial assistance to 
defectors unless this is necessary to pay for their subsistence. 
    At this point, some may argue that proponents of this strategy are committed to the 
provision of more generous packages of financial assistance to defectors and/or to expand the 
scope of recipients. According to these critics, if its aim is really to secure substantive exit 
rights for members of illiberal minority cultures, then it should extend financial assistance to 
defectors who have lost large proportions of their income as a result of a cultural exit and/or 
give defectors more than average people need to maintain themselves. Not to do so, they may 
say, will deny meaningful exit options to those who lose a significant percentage of their 
income if they were to leave their cultural community, regardless of whether they would 
become destitute. 
  
 
 
89 
     To modify an example used by Brian Barry (2002, pp.153), the idea is that if e.g. a shop-
owner would lose 90 percent of his income if he were to exit his cultural community because 
the group’s members would boycott his store, he does not have a substantive right of exit – 
even if he would retain enough money to pay for his subsistence. The reason is that changing 
cultural affiliations would simply be too burdensome for this person. To guarantee him a 
realistic ability to exit, then, critics may contend that the state should grant him financial 
assistance in case he leaves his cultural community. Indeed, they may even go as far as 
claiming that this shop-owner should be given more money than is necessary to pay for his 
subsistence, as, in their view, this amount would cover too small a proportion of the income 
he loses. 
     Though this position may look plausible, I believe that the shop-owner can be ascribed a 
meaningful exit option as long as he can pay for his subsistence, whereas a person who only 
loses 30 percent of her income if she leaves her cultural community, yet who is left destitute, 
cannot. Whilst exiting is undoubtedly very difficult for the shop-owner, there is a relevant 
difference between him and the other person: the shop-owner will retain the ability to live a 
decent life outside his cultural community, as he would still be able to pay the rent and afford 
basic goods such as food, clothing, medicines, et cetera. Equally important, it seems that he 
will normally be aware of this (recall that to have a realistic ability to exit, it is necessary that 
one is able, and knows that one is able, to live a decent life outside one’s cultural community; 
see section 4.1.1). The assumption here is that to deny in these situations that one can live a 
decent life outside one’s cultural community goes against the degree of agency we ordinarily 
attribute to ourselves. After all, most of us regard money as something of which we can have 
more or less of as long as we have enough to cover our subsistence (cf. Phillips, 2007, p.144).  
     If I am right about this, then there is good reason to believe that the shop-owner has a 
substantive right of exit, whereas the person who only loses 30 percent of his income, but is 
left destitute by a cultural exit, does not. This leads us to the following conclusion: to avoid 
gratuitously destabilising minority cultures, which we saw may render it difficult for their 
members to reap various benefits of their cultural membership, it is necessary that the 
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financial assistance for defectors be restricted to those who are left destitute by a cultural exit, 
and that they be given no more than is necessary to pay for their subsistence.
32
 
 
4.2.4 ‘Opening’ the Liberal Majority Culture 
The fourth measure that the state should take to secure substantive exit rights for members of 
illiberal minority cultures is to ensure that the liberal majority culture is open to citizens who 
wish to join it. In order to do so, it should redress the possible racism, xenophobia, and 
prejudices within the liberal majority culture that could obstruct the admission and integration 
of these individuals (recall the discrimination of Turks in the Netherlands and Germany as 
discussed in section 3.3.1). It seems that the strategy’s multicultural curriculum will help to 
realise this goal, as having knowledge of different cultural lifestyles can be expected to 
mitigate these exclusionary sentiments (assuming that ignorance is an important cause of 
racism and xenophobia). Even so, further measures may be required to ensure that members 
of the liberal majority culture become willing to accept new-comers from different cultural 
and religious backgrounds, including advertising campaigns and various educational policies. 
    Now, some may worry whether state attempts to make members of the liberal majority 
culture more welcoming of new-comers do not unduly restrict their individual freedom 
(understood in both the senses distinguished in this dissertation). Should these individuals not 
be free to be close-minded; that is, be free to discourage or prevent members of (illiberal) 
minority cultures from becoming part of the liberal majority culture without facing state 
pressure to accept them?  
    I am not sure whether such pressure can plausibly be thought of as restricting the 
individual freedom of members of the liberal majority culture. Even if it can, however, it 
seems that the relatively modest restrictions that are placed upon their liberty are an evil that 
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 According to Jeff Spinner-Halev, it is incumbent on cultural communities themselves to provide their 
members with financial resources to exit. For example, he notes that the Hutterites should set-up an exit fund 
that guarantees any member who leaves the community a “few thousand dollars” (Spinner-Halev, 2000. p.77). 
The reason why I think this proposal is unsatisfactory is that it seems to place disproportional restrictions on the 
freedom of (some of) the group’s remaining members. As we saw in section 3.2.2., these individuals may 
believe that the motivations defectors have for leaving are morally wrong. In addition to being unjust, it seems 
that requiring the group’s remaining members to pay the full costs also makes it easy for dissident members to 
blackmail other members. As a result, I believe that it is preferable if society as a whole funds the financial 
assistance for defectors, the reason being that this seems to reduce both problems to a substantial degree.  
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is necessary from a liberal perspective to protect the individual freedom of members of 
(illiberal) minority cultures. By ensuring the latter’s access to the liberal majority culture, 
these individuals will be protected from an unfreedom that is far more serious: the unfreedom 
of not having a realistic ability to leave an illiberal cultural community that one does not wish 
to be a member of (see section 3.3.2). 
     This stance may seem to conflict with a claim I made in section 2.3.2, namely that 
attempts to liberalise illiberal minority cultures (even if non-coercive measures are employed) 
should be construed as an infringement on the individual freedom of their conservative 
members. If this already counts as an infringement, then one is led to wonder: does it not also 
infringe on the liberty of members of the liberal majority culture if the state pressures them to 
welcome new-comers of different cultural backgrounds?  
     I think not. Whether the state tries to alter the attitudes of members of the liberal majority 
culture or the attitudes of members of (illiberal) minority cultures makes a normative 
difference. For one thing, state interference with the liberal majority culture is less intrusive 
as the state will normally be dominated by members of this group; that is, within liberal-
democracies, the state’s institutions and policies tend to mirror the values and belief systems 
of the liberal majority culture. This is pertinent, as it suggests that state attempts to change the 
attitudes of its members will be less of an outside intervention than in the case of (illiberal) 
minority cultures.   
     In addition to this, state attempts make the liberal majority culture more open to new-
comers does not seem to impose an alien conception of the good on its members. In order to 
see this, notice that the reluctance of members of the liberal majority culture to accept people 
from particular cultural backgrounds collides with their own commitment to liberalism. It 
certainly is not very liberal to discourage or prevent people from joining one’s cultural 
community, especially if this effectively condemns many of them to remain with a cultural 
community in which they are subordinated. Hence, by encouraging members of the liberal 
majority culture to welcome new-comers of all cultural backgrounds, the state would not so 
much be trying to alter their conception of the good, but rather to sensitise them to a 
commitment they have as (self-proclaimed) liberals, namely not to exclude people on the 
basis of a morally arbitrary feature as their cultural or religious background.  
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4.2.5 Entrance Paths 
The final measure that the state should take in order to secure substantive exit rights for 
members of illiberal minority cultures is to offer citizens what Sigal Ben-Porath (2010) terms 
”entrance paths” into other cultural communities. These paths consist of services to ease the 
transition from one cultural environment to the other. One might think of the provision of 
language support for defectors who do not speak, or are less able to express themselves in the 
language of their new cultural community, or assistance in navigating the housing market and 
financial institutions for those with traditional cultural backgrounds (Ben-Porath, 2010, 
p.1026). Yet another example of an entrance path is the funding of support-groups for 
defectors. Within these groups, people may find socio-psychological and educational support 
provided by those with comparable experiences, which may render it easier for them to build 
up a life into their new cultural environment as they can help one another to meet various 
challenges. Indeed, it seems that subsidising these kinds of organisations is the state’s most 
effective (legitimate) means of mitigating the socio-psychological obstacles to exit that were 
described in section 3.3.1. For example, in Israel, the organisation Hilel was set up for former 
Ultra-Orthodox Jews to ease their transition to a life in the mainstream society (Reitman, 
2005, p.204).
33
 
    Why are entrance paths necessary in order to guarantee members of illiberal minority 
cultures a substantive or meaningful right of exit? The answer, Ben-Porath notes, is that 
“moving from one group to the next” does not make a person “a regular member of the group 
they have entered” (Ben-Porath, 2010, p.1026). Influences of our culture of origin stay with 
us many aspects of our lives– socially, religiously, linguistically, psychologically, et cetera. 
This suggests that even for people who wish to leave their cultural community and can pay 
for their subsistence in case of an exit, becoming a member of another cultural community 
can be a daunting step. Accordingly, to ensure that members of illiberal minority cultures can 
live a decent life outside their cultural community, and that they are aware that they can do 
so, it is necessary that the state makes entrance paths available to them, and keeps then 
informed of the availability of these paths. 
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 These services may remind one of the services that are offered to immigrants to help them integrate into their 
host country. This is no surprise; in many cases, leaving a cultural community is much like leaving a country – 
even if the former does not involve a change of geographical location. 
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5. Objections 
This final chapter aims to answer one of the main objections to the substantive exit rights 
strategy, and exit rights strategies in general. The objection, which has been put forth by 
Susan Okin (2002, p.207), is that the strategy overburdens people by expecting them to leave 
their cultural community if they want to be treated fairly by its members.
34
 Rather than 
having to go through the difficult process of a cultural exit, this objection states that people 
deserve the right to be treated fairly within their cultural community. 
    It should be noted that there are further objections. Perhaps the most important of these is 
that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, whilst granting more freedom to 
illiberal minority cultures than Kymlicka’s approach, still advocates too much interference 
with the internal affairs of these groups. Whilst I address this objection elsewhere (De Vries, 
2014), space constraints do not make it possible to address it in this dissertation.  
     The reason for singling out the objection that my favoured substantive exit rights strategy 
overburdens members of illiberal minority cultures by expecting them to choose between 
their cultural membership and fair treatment has to do with its relevance for contemporary 
Western debates over multiculturalism. Within both academic and political circles in the 
Occident, the argument that minority cultures should not be tolerated and/or receive state 
support as long as they fail to treat their member fairly is frequently invoked (in Western-
Europe, the focus tends to be on groups of conservative Muslims who are said to subject their 
female and homosexual members to unfair treatment). Given the currency of this argument, I 
believe that it is worthwhile considering here why it is problematic for the state to require 
cultural communities to treat their members fairly. 
5.1 ‘Citizens Deserve to be Treated Fairly within Their Culture’ 
For Okin, the problem with exit rights strategies is that they are too stern. In her view, people 
should not have to leave their cultural community in order to escape unfair treatment by its 
members, but instead “deserve the right to be treated fairly within it” (Okin, 2002, p.207). 
Even the availability of substantive or “realistic exit rights”, she writes, will “by no means 
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 Admittedly, those who seek fair treatment could try to change the practices of their cultural community. Yet, 
we saw in section 3.3.2.1 that these attempts are in many cases ineffective, meaning that a cultural exit may 
often be the only way to escape intra-cultural injustice.  
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always” offer an appropriate substitute for fair treatment (Okin, 2002, p.23). Though this 
suggests that there are situations in which the availability of meaningful exit options justifies 
toleration of unfair cultural practices, it does not seem that Okin believes that these situations 
will often, if ever, arise. Not only does she not mention any examples, the thought that the 
availability of “realistic exit rights” can legitimate tolerating intra-cultural injustice also sits 
in uncomfortably with her claim that people have a right to be treated fairly by members of 
their cultural community. 
     Let us therefore assume that, for Okin, substantive exit rights do not normally offer a 
legitimate substitute for fair treatment within cultural communities. The next thing we need to 
do is ask: what does fair treatment involve on Okin’s account?  
     Whilst not offering a definition, the answer suggested in her later work (cf. Okin, 1998; 
1999a, p.11; 2002; pp.229-30) is that members of a given cultural community should respect 
each other’s free and equal status in the conduct of the group’s affairs, that is, that they 
should abide by the basic requirements of liberal justice. Importantly, Okin believes that 
people have a right to fair treatment in the above sense, and that the state ought to protect this 
right “preferably by education, but where necessary by punishment (Okin, 1998, p.676). For 
example, she note elsewhere about the subordination of women that  
 
“The liberal state […] should not only not give special rights or exemptions to cultural and 
religious groups that discriminate against or oppress women. It should also enforce individual 
rights against such groups when the opportunity arises and encourage all groups within its 
borders to cease such practices. Not to do so, from the point of view of a liberal who takes 
women’s, children’s, and other potentially vulnerable persons’ rights seriously, is to let 
toleration for diversity run amok” (Okin, 2002, pp.229-30). 
 
In what follows, my aim is to contest Okin’s claim that the state should require cultural 
communities to treat their members as free and equal, as well as punish those communities 
that refuse to do so.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
95 
5.2 Problems with Okin’s Claim 
5.2.1 Reactive Culturalism and Parochialism 
First, there is a pragmatic problem for Okin’s claim. As I explained in section 2.3.1, state 
attempts to liberalise illiberal minority cultures are often ineffective as they tend to fuel 
reactive culturalism amongst their members. In some cases, we saw that this may even cause 
these groups to become more conservative orthodox than they previously were. Since I 
already discussed the reasons why state attempts to induce liberal reform in cultural 
communities frequently fail in section 2.3.1, I will not go over these again.  
     Another problem that arises for Okin is that her understanding of what constitutes fair 
treatment seems to presuppose the existence of universally valid principles of justice. When 
she claims that people have a right to be treated fairly within their cultural community 
simpliciter, she seems to assume that there is as single set of principles of fairness or justice (I 
use these terms interchangeably) that applies to all cultural communities, or at least to all 
cultural communities within liberal societies.  
     This does not deductively follow, of course. To say that cultural communities should treat 
their members fairly may simply mean that each cultural community should treat its members 
fairly according to its own (i.e. culturally-specific) criteria. I suspect, however, that this is not 
what Okin means; the view that it is legitimate for illiberal cultural communities to treat their 
members in accordance with their own conceptions of justice would be difficult to square 
with her contention that these groups ought to respect their members’ free and equal status. 
Rather, one gets the impression that she believes that there is a universally valid conception 
of justice that should structure the conduct of all cultural communities, or at least all cultural 
communities within liberal societies. Though such a conception may allow for cross-cultural 
differences with regard to the principles of justice that govern each group, the room for these 
differences seems substantially  restricted by Okin’s requirement that these principles be 
recognisably liberal, i.e. that they respect their members’ free and equal status. 
     My aim here is not to deny or affirm that there are universal principles of justice, and, if 
there are, that these principles are liberal in nature. The point I am making is that the 
possibility that there exists a plurality of equally valid or incommensurable conceptions of 
justice is potentially problematic for Okin. For if this is the case (and it is certainly not 
evidently false), then it seems parochial or narrow-minded to require illiberal minority 
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cultures to abide by a sectarian liberal conception of justice in the conduct of their internal 
affairs; the reason being that these groups may uphold an equally valid or incommensurable 
non-liberal conception of justice.  
    Though space constraints do not make it possible to discuss whether liberal principles of 
justice are universally valid (which would also take us well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation), it is suffice it to say that, given the wide variety of conceptions of justice that 
exist across cultures, it would be quite surprising if the only valid conceptions turned out to 
be liberal.   
    Let us suppose, however, that there are principles of justice that are cross-culturally valid, 
and that these principles demand that cultural communities treat their members as free and 
equal. Even then, there remains a more serious problem with requiring illiberal minority 
cultures to abide by a liberal conception of justice in their internal affairs. 
 
5.2.2 Intra-Cultural Justice and Individual Freedom 
The remaining problem is that the attempts by Okin’s state to secure fair treatment for 
citizens within their cultural communities conflict with what was identified as the core liberal 
commitment: the protection of individual freedom (understood in both the senses 
distinguished in this dissertation). By requiring cultural communities to treat their members 
as free and equal, citizens are not only denied the liberty to live in accordance with non-
liberal principles of justice within their cultural community, but also precluded from 
prioritising other values such as social harmony, solidarity, a sense of common-spiritedness, 
et cetera when their demands come into conflict with the precepts of (liberal) justice (cf. 
Parekh, 2006, p.237). The result of this is that conservative members of illiberal minority 
cultures are left little room to act on their illiberal conceptions of the good; for example, it 
appears that within Okin’s society, the Pueblo Indians would not be free to expel religious 
converts from their community, Ultra-Orthodox Jews would not be allowed to refuse women 
the right to initiate divorce, Catholics would not be at liberty to prevent women from joining 
the ranks of priesthood, et cetera.  
     In order to protect the individual freedom of these individuals, then, it seems necessary 
that the state allows citizens to engage in cultural practices that are unjust from a liberal 
perspective. This does not mean that all unjust practices are to be tolerated. As I argued in 
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section 4.1, liberal states have a duty to ensure that citizens are protected from cultural 
practices that are overly detrimental to their ability to change cultural affiliations and/or that 
inflict severe harm on children; insofar as tolerating unjust cultural practices makes it 
impossible for these states to realise one (or both) of these objectives, interference is 
necessary. Rather, the claim I making here is that imposing further restrictions on unjust 
cultural practices would unduly constrain the individual freedom of conservative members of 
illiberal minority cultures.  
     In response, Okin could argue that only the imposition of such further restrictions will 
allow the state to appropriately protect the individual freedom of their dissident members, i.e. 
of those members who do not wish to be exposed to (many of) their culture’s unjust practices.  
    Whilst this argument has some merit, I believe that it lacks enough substance to warrant 
the abandonment of this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy. This is because the 
attempts of Okin’s state to make cultural communities abide by a liberal conception of justice 
– that is to liberalise them - give too much consideration to the individual freedom of their 
dissident members, whilst giving too little consideration to the individual freedom of their 
conservative members.
 35
 Since my argument for this claim is identical to the argument I 
offered in section 2.3.2.2 when I argued that the attempts of Kymlicka’s state to create a 
“wholly liberal society” unjustly favour the interests of dissident members of illiberal 
minority cultures over those of their conservative members, I will not repeat this argument.   
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 It should be reiterated that these conservative members may include people who – from a liberal perspective - 
are treated unfairly by their cultural or religious community such as Catholic women who support the church’s 
ban on female priesthood (see section 2.3.1.2). 
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6. Conclusion 
This dissertation has argued that in dealing with internally illiberal minority cultures, the 
liberal state should avoid trying to liberalise these groups as Kymlicka’s strategy prescribes, 
as well as pursuing a laissez-faire approach whereby the only restriction on their internal 
conduct is that they cannot forcefully prevent their members from leaving as Kukathas’ 
strategy proposes. In both cases, we saw that the core liberal commitment to the protection of 
individual freedom is not met; whereas Kymlicka’s strategy fails to appropriately protect the 
individual freedom of conservative members of illiberal minority cultures, Kukathas’ strategy 
does not give due protection to the individual freedom of their dissident members. The 
substantive exit rights strategy I subsequently proposed was shown to make the trade-off 
between the colliding liberties of these subgroups in a fairer way than each of these strategies. 
Whilst allowing conservative members room to act on their illiberal conceptions of the good, 
this strategy safeguards the ability of dissident members to act on their (more) progressive 
conceptions of the good by guaranteeing them substantive exit rights. In addition to this, we 
saw that it protects children by requiring the state to remedy illiberal cultural practices that 
severely harm them. This is important, because children’s lack of a meaningful exit option 
means that they have no realistic ability of avoiding such practices. 
     I want to conclude by noting that in an ideal world, there may be no need to secure 
substantive exit rights for members of illiberal minority cultures, at least if one rejects my 
argument that it is important from a liberal perspective to guarantee them a realistic ability to 
join the liberal majority culture regardless of whether they wish to join it.
36
 
 
The reason for 
this is that none of these members are, or will become, dissatisfied with their cultural 
membership.
37
 
    However, this is not our world; within our sublunary realm, there are members of illiberal 
minority cultures who are, or will become, dissatisfied with their cultural membership, and 
                                                 
36
 I argued in section 4.1.1 that liberals should find it troubling if people lack a meaningful opportunity to join a 
cultural group in which they can exercise their full range of basic rights and liberties, irrespective of whether 
they wish to do so. 
37
 Though it is true that some liberals, depending on whether they want the state to promote freedom 1 or 
freedom 2 (see section 1.1), may still advocate a compulsory autonomy-facilitating education for children of 
illiberal minority cultures. 
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who may wish to join the liberal majority culture as a result. The fact that this is unlikely to 
change in the foreseeable future suggests that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights 
strategy is likely to remain the best liberal strategy for dealing with internally illiberal 
minority cultures. 
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